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During 2017 the expansionary phase of the Spanish economy continued, with GDP 
growth exceeding the forecasts in place at the start of the year. Specifically, output in 
the economy increased by 3.1%, slightly down on the figure observed for the two previous 
years. The continuation of a high rate of expansion of activity, which has held up in the 
opening months of 2018, has helped the unemployment rate to continue declining rapidly, 
although at the end of Q1 this year it still remained at a very high level (16.7%).
The greater increase in activity in Spain compared with previous expectations was 
largely due to the favourable behaviour of external markets. The acceleration in the 
pace of growth of the global economy came about against a background of highly 
favourable financial conditions, higher business and consumer confidence, and a rise in 
commodities prices. Notable among the advanced economies was the dynamism of the 
euro area, which experienced robust growth that spread across the board to all its 
members. Despite the buoyancy of activity, euro area inflation held at very moderate rates. 
The recovery in Spain evidences features that should contribute to its prolongation 
over time. The current expansion is proving compatible with the running of an external 
surplus. Beyond the contribution of certain transitory factors, such as the low levels of oil 
prices and of interest rates, the positive external balance is largely due to the gains in 
competitiveness recorded since the crisis. As a result, and unlike the expansion that 
preceded the crisis, the current upturn is more balanced in terms of domestic and external 
demand, and it has been compatible with private-sector deleveraging in the economy.
However, the economy continues to show elements of vulnerability, compounded by 
an external environment in which pockets of risk and instability persist. Despite the 
headway in reducing the budget deficit, the structural budgetary imbalance remains 
pronounced and the correction of the sector’s high debt has, to date, been but very 
modest. Also, the positive external balance since 2013 has not prevented the net debtor 
position vis-à-vis the rest of the world from continuing to be high. In place alongside these 
accumulated imbalances are certain inefficiencies in the functioning of the markets for 
labour and for goods and services, which detract from the quality of the recovery. 
Population ageing is, moreover, a primordial challenge for economic growth and the 
sustainability of public finances. In the external environment, while expansionary inertia 
may be expected to continue in the short term, certain risks persist. These are associated 
with re-pricing on international financial markets, with uncertainty over the negotiations as 
to the shape of the new arrangements between the EU and the United Kingdom, and with 
the changes under way in respect of US trade policy, which point to increased constraints 
on global trade. 
The medium- and long-term challenges should be tackled by a far-reaching reform 
agenda, both domestically and at the European level. Demand-side policies – both 
fiscal and, especially, monetary policy – have set in place conditions favourable to 
economic growth in recent years. In future, however, budgetary policy should be geared to 
reducing the high public debt. As the recovery takes root in the euro area as a whole, the 
increase in the degree of capacity utilisation will foreseeably translate into a rise in inflation 
and, therefore, open the way for a less expansionary monetary policy stance. Against this 
background, sustained and inclusive economic growth requires reforms that provide for 
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the replacement of the cyclical impulse of demand-side policies. The necessary reform 
momentum should take advantage of the exceptional macroeconomic bonanza to resolve 
the Spanish economy’s outstanding structural problems. Momentum is also necessary at 
the European level to reinforce the Economic and Monetary Union project, which requires 
combining a greater degree of solidarity and risk-sharing among Member States.
The global economy raised its growth rate in 2017 to a greater extent than expected. 
Global GDP grew by 3.8% last year, around 0.5 pp up on 2016 (see Chart 1.1.1). Moreover, 
for the first time since the end of the global financial crisis, growth outperformed the 
expectations set at the beginning of the year. This acceleration in activity, which was fairly 
widespread geographically, was more marked in the case of the advanced economies, 
whose growth increased by 0.6 pp to 2.3%. Among the main countries in this group, the 
United Kingdom was the sole exception in respect of the greater dynamism shown. The 
pace of output in the emerging economies increased by 0.4 pp to 4.8%, partly as a result 
of the emergence by Brazil and Russia from recession.
The greater robustness of the global economy was mainly due to cyclical factors 
and, in the case of the advanced economies, the momentum of investment was the 
most notable reason. The improvement in activity came about against a background of 
continuing highly favourable financial conditions, a predominantly accommodative 
macroeconomic policy stance, greater business and consumer confidence, and a pick-up 
in commodities prices, which eased the delicate situation of the commodities-exporting 
economies. Moreover, following a prolonged period of weak investment in the main 
advanced economies, this component rebounded, assisted by the high level of plant 
capacity utilisation and by the sound behaviour of business profits (see Chart 1.1.2).1
International trade rose appreciably in 2017, following its marked slackness in 2015 
and 2016. Trade growth during 2017 was 4.9%, the best figure since 2011. The intensity 
of the various factors behind such growth and its geographical scope changed progressively 
during the year. In early 2017 Chinese trade activity was highly dynamic, related partly to 
the fiscal stimuli activated in order to check the slowdown in the Chinese economy, which 
would have fed through to other Asian economies through the regional value chains. In the 
second half of the year, the thrust of trade resided to a greater extent on the strength of the 
euro area and other advanced economies, and was associated with the reactivation of 
business investment, the domestic expenditure component to which trade is most 
sensitive.
Global inflation in 2017 remained contained despite the rise in oil prices. Oil has 
become significantly dearer over the course of 2017 and in 2018 to date, chiefly in response 
to the widespread recovery in global demand and, to a lesser extent, to the extension of 
the agreement of the OPEC countries and other producers to cut production throughout 
the year, to episodes of geopolitical tension in the Middle East and to the depreciation of 
the dollar (see Chart 1.1.3). In the advanced economies, consumer price inflation rose 
significantly to 1.7%, after having posted a figure of 0.8% in 2016. This reflected, above 
all, the rise in oil prices, whose impact was mainly felt in the first half of the year (see 
Chart 1.1.4). Conversely, in the emerging economies inflation fell by 0.3 pp to 4%, in some 
cases as the effects of the past depreciations of their currencies petered out. Beyond the 
energy component, core consumer price inflation has held at moderate levels and, in most 
advanced economies, below central bank targets. 
2  Towards an improved 
external outlook
2.1  A SHARPER AND MORE 
DIVERSIFIED GLOBAL 
RECOVERY 
1  In this respect see Chapter 3 of this Report.
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SOURCES: WEO (World Economic Outlook) and Datastream.
a Forecasts from IMF World Economic Outlook Update, January 2017.
b Aggregate of United States, euro area, United Kingdom and Japan.
The global economy recorded a higher than expected rate of growth in 2017. This greater dynamism of the global economy was reflected in strong 
investment momentum and in the recovery of global trade. However, despite the renewed strength of global demand and the rise in oil prices, inflation 
remained contained in the main geographical areas. As the economic cycle progressed in advanced economies, the Federal Reserve tightened its 
monetary policy and expectations of rate rises by other advanced economy central banks were factored in, against a backdrop of high risk appetite and 
low volatility.
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Monetary policy in the United States and the United Kingdom has progressively 
tilted towards a less easy stance. In the United States, where the economy is relatively 
ahead in the cycle, the Federal Reserve raised its policy rate by 25 bp on three occasions 
during 2017 and once again in March 2018, placing it in a range between 1.5% and 1.75% 
(see Chart 1.1.5). Moreover, in October it began gradually to reduce its balance sheet, 
following the plans announced before the summer. These movements took place in a 
setting in which the Federal Reserve has had to address the dilemma of adopting decisions 
in an economy with moderate inflationary pressures but with a very low unemployment 
level and with signs of overvaluation in certain financial market segments. The Bank of 
England, for its part, raised its policy rate by 25 bp in November, the first rise in 11 years, 
after noting that inflation was holding above target in its forecasting horizon. 
The current US Administration announced some significant changes in its economic 
policies. On the fiscal front, a tax reform was approved in late 2017 and, into 2018, a 
budgetary agreement was reached to raise the expenditure ceiling and an infrastructure 
investment plan was announced. Although the fiscal reform was of a more limited scope 
than that contained in the electoral programme, the set of measures adopted has entailed 
a significant raising of the US growth forecast in the short term, with growth estimated to 
stand at around 3% and 2.5% in 2018 and 2019, respectively. As regards trade policy, the 
negotiations on the reform of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which 
began in mid-2017, have seen scarcely any progress. Moreover, the tariff rises announced 
by the US Administration in the opening months of 2018 on specific products from a broad 
range of countries confirm the feared turn towards protectionist positions. These measures, 
along with the responses by the authorities of the countries concerned, may ultimately 
result in a trade war, which could weigh down trade and economic activity globally. The 
historical evidence available shows that protectionism is harmful to well-being and global 
growth. Trade barriers distort the allocation of resources in the short term, prompting 
losses in efficiency. In the medium and long term, they have an adverse bearing on total 
factor productivity, chiefly as a result of the downturn in innovation and in the adoption and 
dissemination of new technologies, and lower managerial quality.2
In the emerging economies, macroeconomic policies have been fairly heterogeneous, 
differing in terms of the cyclical position and of the imbalances accumulated. In the 
monetary policy sphere, the moderation in inflation has provided for the prolongation of 
the cycle of easing in the main Latin American economies (with the exception of Mexico) 
and in Russia, in contrast to the muted rises in policy rates agreed by some central banks 
in other emerging areas. In particular, in China, the economic authorities have continued to 
pursue an economic policy course that has had as its dual objectives the lessening of 
financial risks and support for growth. With regard to the goal of safeguarding financial 
stability, the central bank adopted, over the course of the year, small-scale rises in interest 
rates, while the government approved the launch of the fiscal stimulus package ahead of 
the signs of a slowdown in activity.
The international financial markets saw a continuing appetite for risk and low 
volatility. This behaviour can be attributed to an environment of favourable economic 
activity figures, contained inflation and abundant liquidity built up after several years of 
highly expansionary monetary policies. Against this backdrop, investors’ search for yield 
2  See the box entitled “The possible effects of a reversal of globalisation” in Annual Report 2016, Banco de España 
and the analytical article “Situation of and outlook for the global economy at the start of 2018”, Economic 
Bulletin, 2/2018, Banco de España.
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remained intense, materialising in increases in the prices of numerous assets. Hence the 
main stock market indices, for developed and emerging economies alike, increased in 
2017, with a notable rise of close to 20% in the United States to a new all-time high (see 
Chart 1.1.6). Moreover, emerging economies’ sovereign debt spreads and those on the 
worst-rated corporate bonds were squeezed significantly during the year. As a result of 
these equity and bond market trends, and of the depreciation of the dollar, US financial 
conditions tended to ease, despite the tightening of monetary policy. 
Nonetheless, in the opening months of 2018, there was a bout of notable volatility on 
the financial markets. At the start of the year, coinciding with a further improvement in 
the outlook for economic activity and with an increase in inflation expectations, the rise in 
US 10-year government bond yields that began in September 2017 steepened. In February 
this year, moreover, there was a significant correction of share prices on the main 
international markets, following the sudden signs of an increase in wage inflation in the 
United States which were interpreted as indicative of an inflationary rise and, therefore, of 
the fact that the pace of policy interest rate rises might accelerate relative to what had 
hitherto been anticipated. This episode of price corrections and rising volatility, which was 
amplified by certain market practices, spread to other international stock markets, but 
scarcely influenced bond markets.3
The global outlook remains complex despite the recent robustness of the world 
economy. The recent improvement in activity is predominantly rooted in the economic 
cycle, without significant increases in potential growth having apparently been recorded. 
Against this backdrop, the rate of increase of output in the advanced economies will 
foreseeably resume more moderate levels in the medium term and the increases in output 
above the potential rate may be expected to ultimately feed through to prices, leading 
inflation to converge on central bank targets. In the case of the emerging economies, 
expected growth would, on average, be around its potential rate, although there is notable 
heterogeneity across countries and regions. 
Notable among the main risks to global growth are the potential correction of values 
on certain international financial market segments and the increase in protectionism. 
While additional positive surprises cannot be ruled out in the short term, in the medium 
term several significant risks persist. A hypothetical adjustment of asset prices might 
come about as a result of geopolitical events or in the face of unanticipated economic 
policy measures which, in some cases, might trigger sharp rises in financing costs and 
sudden capital switching, which would be particularly harmful for the economies most 
exposed to external financing. Also, the negotiations on the new shape of the EU-UK 
economic relationship, along with the protectionist slant adopted by the United States in 
its trade policy, remain areas of risk insofar as they point to an increase in the restrictions 
on global trade. 
The euro area economy expanded robustly in 2017, across all its members, and, as 
in other regions, the upturn was greater than forecast at the end of the previous 
year. Following several years of moderate growth, GDP adjusted for calendar effects 
increased by 2.5% in 2017, one of the highest rates observed since the launch of the euro 
(see Chart 1.2.1), set against the Eurosystem’s December 2016 forecast of 1.7%. The 
buoyancy of domestic demand – in terms both of private consumption and investment – 
2.2  ROBUST EURO AREA 
GROWTH 
3  See the box “Global stock market correction and volatility episode” in the Quarterly Report on the Spanish 
Economy, March 2018, Banco de España.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 26 ANNUAL REPORT, 2017 1. THE RECOVERY IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY: THE LIMITS OF DEMAND-SIDE POLICIES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
SOURCES: Banco de España, ECB and Eurostat.
a Unweighted standard deviation of year-on-year rates of change of euro area countries' GDP.
b The unemployment rate is the quarterly average of the monthly rates. The expanded unemployment rate takes into account individuals who are unemployed, 
underemployed, available for but not seeking work and unavailable for work. It is calculated by including in the denominator, in addition to the labour force, workers 
who are available for but not seeking work and those who are unavailable for work. See the influence of these factors on alternative measures of unemployment 
in "Quarterly report on the Spanish economy", Economic Bulletin, 2/2017, Banco de España.
c Year-on-year rate of change.
d NEER-38 is the nominal effective exchange rate of the euro against the currencies of the 38 most important trading partners of the euro area.
e The FCI is a weighted aggregation of changes in financial variables: 3-month Euribor (with a weighting of 0.18), the euro area 10-year interest rate (0.23), the 
NEER (0.10) and the EURO STOXX (0.012). It is expressed normalised by the weighting of short-term interest rates.
Widespread robust economic growth, with a lower level of dispersion in terms of GDP growth between the different countries. Inflation remained at 
moderate levels, despite the dynamic growth in activity which was accompanied by intense job creation. The unemployment rate continued to fall, 
although complementary indicators suggest that there is still a high degree of labour market slack, and wages climbed moderately. Financial conditions 
remain very favourable, despite the appreciation of the euro.
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combined with the strength of exports to drive this acceleration in activity. Moreover, the 
growth in the economy helped lead, on the estimates available, to the practical 
disappearance in late 2017 of the negative output gap that arose further to the crisis. The 
favourable economic situation was extensive to both sectors and countries, as shown by 
the dispersion indicators, which are at historically low levels. 
The expansion in activity is proving intense in terms of employment generation. In 
2017, numbers employed grew by 1.6%. The strength of job creation, which has benefited 
from the labour reforms undertaken in certain member countries and from a moderate rise 
in real wages, allowed for continuing reductions in the unemployment rate, which stood at 
the end of the year at 8.6%, still 1.3 pp above its pre-crisis level (see Chart 1.2.4). However, 
this aggregate figure masks substantial cross-country differences, which range from an 
unemployment rate below 4% in Germany to 20% in Greece and 16.5% in Spain. 
Easy financial conditions prevailed in 2017, fundamentally reflecting the maintenance 
of a highly accommodative monetary policy. Money and debt market yields held at low 
levels, with sovereign spreads over the German Bund narrowing, especially in some of the 
countries that had been most affected by the crisis, such as Portugal and Greece. This 
narrowing has continued in 2018 to date and has spread to Spain, against a background 
of perceived improvements in its debt ratings, reflected also in upgrades by several 
agencies.4 Share prices also rose notably in 2017 (the Eurostoxx index was up 10%), as a 
result of the improvement in expected profits. Private sector financing costs also held at 
historically low levels, while lending standards did not undergo significant changes during 
the year, thereby supporting the recovering trajectory of loans granted to households and 
firms. Nonetheless, the favourable course of these variables was offset by the notable 
appreciation of the euro (up 14% against the dollar over the year as a whole; see 
Chart 1.2.5), meaning that, for the purposes of the financial conditions indicator, standards 
tightened slightly in the second half of 2017 and somewhat more in early 2018 as a result 
of the stock market correction (see Chart 1.2.6). 
The favourable financial conditions, the sound performance of employment and, 
consequently, the growth of income have all supported private demand. Of note 
under the private demand heading is the improvement in business investment, further 
spurred by the increase in confidence, profits growth and the sound behaviour of final 
demand. Specifically, investment in equipment increased by 4.9%, rising at end-2017 
close to its pre-crisis level. 
Exports, boosted by the improvement in world trade, have contributed to the 
momentum of activity, despite the notable appreciation of the euro. The strength of 
exports, which increased by over 5%, was practically extensive to all the euro area 
countries, with German and Italian sales standing out. In terms of geographical destinations, 
goods exports increased within the euro area as did those targeted on China and the 
United States, despite the adverse impact of the appreciation of the euro observed in 
2017, whereby the euro area’s share in overall global trade was hardly affected. 
Following the consolidation process in the previous years, fiscal policy maintained a 
practically neutral stance in 2017. The budgetary policy stance took the form of the 
maintenance of the cyclically adjusted primary balance at approximately its 2016 level. 
4  Specifically, for the Spanish case, the revisions were as follows: in January, Fitch changed its rating to A-; in 
March, S&P, also to A-; and in April, DBRS to A and Moody’s to Baa1.
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The favourable cyclical juncture and lower interest payments led, in the area as a whole, to 
a reduction in the budget deficit to 0.9% of GDP and to a further reduction in the public 
debt/GDP ratio to 86.7%, although this variable remains at notably higher levels in some 
countries. 
Despite the buoyancy of activity, inflation has held at very moderate rates. Following 
the rise in the opening months of 2017, associated mainly with base effects of the energy 
component, overall consumer price inflation resumed a lower rate, standing in March 2018 
at 1.3% (see Chart 1.2.2). Core inflation, too, which excludes the most volatile components 
from the overall index, has held at very stable levels – at around 1% – for most of the period, 
despite the narrowing of the output gap and the impact stemming from higher oil prices. 
Such price behaviour is in response to the confluence of different factors that have also 
affected other developed economies. These factors include some of a more structural type, 
such as the increase in competition arising from globalisation or the less inflationary 
dynamics linked to technological progress, along with others which, though more transitory 
in nature, have exerted very persistent effects, such as the low levels of oil prices and other 
commodities in past years. Moreover, in the case of the euro area, the easing in inflation 
may also have been due in part to predominantly domestic factors, such as the appreciation 
of the euro and the moderate increase in margins and in unit labour costs (ULCs). Wages 
grew by 1.6%, rising somewhat at the end of the year. Behind this wage moderation are 
various factors: low productivity growth, the existence of indexing mechanisms that take as 
a reference the past behaviour of inflation and the persistence of a certain slackness in the 
labour market the degree of which exceeds what may be inferred from the more traditional 
measures of unemployment, owing above all to the presence of a high number of part-time 
workers who would wish to extend the duration of their working day (see Chart 1.2.3).5
The moderate inflation outlook determined the accommodative stance of monetary 
policy in 2017. The monetary stimulus continued to rest on the operation of a broad set of 
monetary policy instruments, as has been the case since 2014, in the absence of clear 
signs of a sustained increase in inflation towards rates consistent with the price stability 
definition.6 The financial indicators of inflation expectations pointed in early 2017 to the 
prospect of very slow convergence by the rate of change of consumer prices towards 
levels close to 2%, although they also noted that the risks of deflation had been dispelled 
(see Chart 1.3.1). In this scenario, policy interest rates held at very low levels, namely 0% 
on the main refinancing operations and -0.40% on the deposit facility rate (see Chart 1.3.2). 
The Eurosystem, for its part, continued to inject liquidity through its large-scale private and 
public asset purchase programmes (APP).7 Net public and private bond purchases totalled 
€780 billion in 2017, meaning that at the end of the year the APP portfolio amounted to 
almost €2.3 trillion (see Chart 1.3.3). Gross purchases were higher, since the maturing 
securities acquired in prior years were reinvested, a policy that will continue for a long 
period after net purchases have finalised. In a complementary fashion, to reinforce 
monetary transmission through the credit channel, the last targeted longer-term refinancing 
operation (TLTRO-II) was conducted in March 2017. There was exceptional demand for 
funds, and the operation concluded with a net injection of almost €217 billion, raising the 
financing granted under the TLTRO programmes to over €760 billion. Lastly, the ECB 
5  These factors are analysed in detail in Box 1.3 “Wage growth in the euro area”, ”Quarterly report on the Spanish 
economy”, Economic Bulletin, 3/2017, Banco de España.
6  Section 4.2 of this chapter describes the actions undertaken during this phase by the ECB, while Box 1.3 
assesses their impact on activity and prices.
7  The private securities are asset-backed bonds, covered bonds (“cédulas hipotecarias” in Spain) and corporate 
bonds, acquired respectively under the ABSPP, CBPP-3 and CSPP programmes.
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continued to resort to forward guidance in respect both of its policy rates and the APP in 
order to underscore expectations that monetary policy will retain an accommodative 
stance over a prolonged period (see Chart 1.3.4). 
The expansion of activity in the euro area as a whole progressively firmed, leading to 
some adjustments in monetary policy instruments. In June 2017, the improved 
economic outlook and the easing in downside risks for inflation led the ECB to withdraw 
the accommodative bias still present in its indications as to policy interest rates, eliminating 
the reference to the possibility of such rates being lowered from those then prevailing. 
Months later, in October, the temporary extension of the APP until at least September 2018 
was announced, along with the reduction in the pace of net monthly purchases from 
€60 billion to €30 billion as from January 2018 (see Chart 1.3.3).8 The improved outlook has 
led more recently, in March 2018, to the elimination of the reference whereby, faced with a 
SOURCES: ECB, Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters.
The ECB's monetary policy maintained its expansionary stance as there were no clear signs of a sustained rise in inflation towards levels consistent with 
the reference value, against a backdrop of a small climb in medium-term inflation expectations. Monetary stimulus continued to be based on historically 
low official interest rates, asset purchases and the communication policy. Interest rate expectations remain low.
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8  See the box “Monetary policy decisions adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB in October”, in “Quarterly 
report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 4/2017, Banco de España.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 30 ANNUAL REPORT, 2017 1. THE RECOVERY IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY: THE LIMITS OF DEMAND-SIDE POLICIES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
potential deterioration in the economic situation or in financial conditions to levels not 
consistent with achieving the inflation objective, the Council would stand ready to increase 
the size and/or the duration of the purchase programme. Nonetheless, the progress 
observed in the convergence of inflation towards rates more compatible with the monetary 
policy medium-term objective is still insufficient, which warrants monetary policy remaining 
geared to continuing easy financial conditions.
Available forecasts suggest continuity in the medium term of the current upturn and 
gradual convergence by the inflation rate on the price stability objective. The 
information received in 2018 to date points to the maintenance of the economic expansion, 
albeit at a lesser pace than that recorded at end-2017. As regards prices, the widening of 
the positive output gap is expected to translate into a gradual increase in core inflation. 
Over a longer time horizon, there is room for improvement in the use of productive 
factors so that they may contribute to the continuity of the expansionary phase. High 
youth and long-term unemployment, along with the high percentage of employees 
involuntarily working part-time and the moderate recovery in total hours worked, suggest 
that, despite the significant reduction in the unemployment rate, the degree of 
underutilisation of the labour factor is still high (see Charts 1.2.3 and 1.2.4). Also, following 
the low levels of private investment in past years, in an environment of corporate and 
household deleveraging, a strengthening in the rate of investment may be expected for the 
coming years, underpinned by the observed improvement in its determinants and 
supported by the restored health of bank balance sheets. A rebound in public investment 
is likewise desirable, especially in those countries with greater budgetary headroom, which 
would contribute to the correction of current account imbalances in the euro area falling 
more evenly between surplus- and deficit-running countries.9 Moreover, greater dynamism 
in aggregate investment would help correct the persistence of the high current account 
surplus in the euro area as a whole and raise the potential growth rate.
The expansionary trajectory of the Spanish economy continued into 2017, with GDP 
growth once again exceeding 3% for the third year running. Specifically, output 
increased by 3.1%, 0.2 pp down on the previous year (see Table 1.1 and Chart 1.4.1). The 
contribution of national demand to the increase in GDP was 2.8 pp, 0.3 pp up on 2016, 
with the contribution of investment increasing somewhat (see Charts 1.4.2 and 1.4.3). Net 
external demand made a positive contribution of 0.3 pp, less than that in 2016, when it 
amounted to 0.7 pp. Also for the third year running, the increase in output clearly outpaced 
that in the euro area as a whole (see Charts 1.4.1 and 1.4.4).
Growth slowed slightly towards the end of 2017. The rising path of GDP scarcely varied 
in the course of last year, posting quarter-on-quarter growth of 0.8%, on average, a similar 
rate to that observed since mid-2014, with a slight downturn at the end of last year. As a 
result, the increase in political uncertainty in the second half of the year, as a result of the 
situation in the Catalonia region (see Box 1.1), is estimated to have had a moderate impact 
on GDP growth for the Spanish economy as a whole, which will moreover have been offset 
by the improved external setting.10 The expansion has continued at a similar pace to date 
3  The prolongation of the 
upturn in the Spanish 
economy in 2017 
 9  See Chapter 4 “Fiscal policy in the euro area”, Annual Report 2016, Banco de España. 
10  Box 3 of the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 4/2017, Banco de España reviews 
the effects observed in the final stretch of 2017 as a result of the uncertainty associated with the political 
situation in Catalonia. In turn, Box 1.1 of the ”Financial Stabilty Report”, 11/2017, Banco de España describes 
the possible medium-term effects under different hypothetical scenarios relating to the scale and persistence 
of the rise in uncertainty.
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SOURCES: INE, IGAE, AMECO and Banco de España.
a Spanish National Accounts data, base year 2010.
b Volume indices. Annual rates of change.
c Rates of change, except the unemployment rate which is a level.
d Employment rate (16-64 age group).
e Levels as a percentage of GDP.
f Annual average levels for the Madrid Stock Exchange General Index, interest rates and exchange rates, and rates of change for financial liabilities.
g 1999 Q1 = 100.
h 1999 Q1 = 100. Measured with unit labour costs.
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in 2018, giving rise to a positive cyclical gap which is expected to carry on increasing in 
the coming years.11
As in previous years, the rate of increase of activity once again exceeded prior 
expectations at the start of the year. Specifically, the Banco de España projected in 
December 2016 that growth in 2017 would be 2.5%, 0.6 pp down on the figure finally 
observed. In general, all the final demand components increased by more than expected, 
with exports and investment notably strong compared with the projections.
The positive surprise is mainly attributable to external markets performing more 
favourably than envisaged before the start of the year. The formulation of macroeconomic 
forecasts usually rests on a set of technical assumptions about various variables upon which 
the projection is conditional. The gap between the forecast and the actual GDP growth figure 
observed in 2017 would largely be because there was a significant deviation in the behaviour 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
Once again the rate of growth of GDP exceeded 3%, with a relatively uniform time profile throughout the year. The expansionary behaviour of domestic 
demand was favoured by accommodative financial conditions. The net external demand contribution was positive again, albeit somewhat less so than 
in 2016, against a backdrop of higher exports and, particularly, higher imports.
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11  See Box 6 “The cyclical position of the Spanish economy” in “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, 
Economic Bulletin, 1/2018, Banco de España.
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of foreign markets, which proved more favourable than was expected at end-2016. The 
deviations in the rest of the technical assumptions (interest rates, stock market prices, oil 
prices, etc.) are estimated, overall, to have had a much lesser impact. To reach this conclusion 
the 2017 GDP growth projections formulated in December 2016, using the MTBE (Quarterly 
Macroeconomic Model of the Banco de España) with the set of assumptions then prevailing, 
have been compared with those that would have been formulated had the finally observed 
figures for the assumptions then been known.12 The fact that the actual growth of 3.1% 
should have exceeded the MTBE forecast by 0.2 pp, once the assumptions upon which the 
projection is conditional were known, suggests that factors other than those captured by the 
historical relationships estimated in the model may have been operating in a positive direction.
Prices and costs in the economy once again grew very moderately. Consumer prices 
increased on average by 2% in 2017, but this increase was influenced by the higher level, 
in annual average terms, of oil prices; as a result, the rate of increase of the indicator that 
excludes the energy component was far lower, at 1.2%. The GDP deflator, which proxies 
the prices of domestically produced goods, posted a similar (1%) increase for the latter 
figure, as a result of very modest growth in labour costs per unit of value added, which 
increased in the market economy by 0.2%, while the rise in the unit operating surplus, 
including taxes, was close to 2.5%.
In 2017, Spanish households’ financial conditions remained very easy. The maintenance 
of the expansionary monetary policy stance is allowing the average interest rates on bank 
financing to hold at low levels, close to their historical lows (see Chart 1.5.1). Further, the 
Bank Lending Survey (BLS) registered a slight improvement in access to lending during 
the year as a whole, which has helped lending activity continue to recover (see Chart 
1.5.2). The increase in new lending business has translated into an easing in the rate of 
decline of the outstanding balance of household debt (from 1.3% in December 2016 to 
0.8% one year later). By end-use, the outcome was a lesser contraction in lending for 
house purchases and greater dynamism in consumer credit and other lending. 
As has been the case since the crisis broke, the low level of financing costs has 
continued to be a factor supporting household income. It is thus estimated that the 
cumulative decline in interest rates from 2008 to 2017 has contributed, in net terms, to 
raising household disposable income in 2017 by around 1 pp.13
Households’ financial situation continued to strengthen during 2017, which also 
contributed to boosting expenditure in the sector. Household debt fell to below 100% 
of its gross disposable income (GDI) and 61% of GDP, ratios still somewhat higher than – 
though now very close to – average euro area ratios. Net wealth in this sector has also 
been boosted by increased asset values, especially property, with a rise in house prices of 
7.2% in 2017 (see Chart 1.6.1). 
3.1  THE ROBUSTNESS OF 
ACTIVITY WAS EXTENSIVE 
TO MOST DEMAND 
COMPONENTS 
12  Specifically, the model’s projections before the introduction of the experts’ opinions would, in each case, have 
been 2.5% and 2.9%, respectively. Three-quarters of the difference of 0.4 pp between these two figures would 
be due to the fact that external markets fared better than projected, with the remainder attributable to the 
surprises in the remaining assumptions as a whole. See New version of the Quarterly Model of Banco de 
España (MTBE), Documento Ocasional, no. 1709, Banco de España for a description both of the model’s main 
mechanisms and of the simulations of the effects of the errors in the assumptions on those upon which the 
projection is conditional.
13  This reduction in interest rates has affected both asset-side and liabilities-side operations, with a highly 
heterogeneous impact on the income of different households, depending on the sign and magnitude of their net 
assets, as illustrated by the fact that the figures relating to the cumulative effect of the fall in interest rates from 
2008 to 2017 on disposable income for this latter year through interest received and paid were, respectively, 
negative of the order of 2.9 pp and 3.9 pp.
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From 2014 to 2017, real wages grew by 0.4% in cumulative terms. These overall 
developments mask very different sub-periods, with a 2.4 pp increase in real wages from 
2014 to 2015, stabilisation in 2016 and a 2 pp loss in purchasing power in 2017, linked to 
the rise in the inflation energy component. 
The slowdown in real household income led, given the lesser scale of the loss of 
momentum in consumption, to a steepening of the decline in the saving rate. 
Household income grew by 2% in nominal terms in 2017, a similar rate to that observed a 
year earlier. Nonetheless, the inflationary rise due to the energy component of consumer 
prices meant that, in real terms, the increase in income was only 0.2% (1.8 pp down on the 
previous year) (see Chart 1.7). The magnitude of the slowdown in private consumption in 
real terms was far less (0.6 pp, to 2.4%), whereby the compression of household income 
gave rise to a 2 pp reduction in the household saving rate, to 5.7% of disposable income, 
its lowest level since the creation of the monetary union. 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a This indicator reflects the proportion of firms to which any of the following apply: loan application rejected; loan approved only partially; loan approved at what firm 
considered to be a very high cost; and loan not requested because firm did not expect it to be approved (fear of rejection).
b Cumulative 3-month flow.
Households' and NFCs' financing conditions remained very favourable, with financing costs continuing at historically low levels. In addition, access to 
bank credit continued to improve for these sectors, especially for SMEs. In this setting, credit activity continued to recover.
CHART 1.5THE SPANISH ECONOMY'S FINANCING CONDITIONS REMAIN HIGHLY FAVOURABLE
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The reduction in the saving rate in 2017 entails the prolongation of a downtrend 
under way over the past eight years. In Spain, the fluctuations in the saving rate since 
the onset of the crisis have been much greater than in the core euro area countries, since 
the oscillations in consumption and income have also been greater. The Spanish household 
saving rate increased at the start of the crisis to a level of over 13% of disposable income 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Cumulative four-quarter data.
b Estimate based on estimated change in housing stock, average floor area of housing and price per m2.
c Interest-bearing borrowing.
d Seasonally and calendar-adjusted series.
In 2017 the financial position of Spanish households and non-financial corporations continued to strengthen, with further reductions in their indebtedness 
ratios and, in the case of households, increases in their net wealth also, mainly thanks to rising house prices. The lower indebtedness ratios, along with 
the decline in the average cost of liabilities, led to a reduction in the degree of financial pressure.
CHART 1.6THE FINANCIAL POSITION OF HOUSEHOLDS AND NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS CONTINUED 
TO STRENGTHEN
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The continued decline in the saving rate in recent years is probably linked to factors such as diminished uncertainty and satisfaction of the demand, 
especially for durable goods, that built up during the crisis. In 2017 household income continued to grow at a fast pace in nominal terms. However, higher 
inflation meant that, in real terms, there was a significant slowdown in income. Given that households reduced their consumption to a lesser extent, the 
decline in the saving rate intensified.
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CHART 1.7
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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at end-2009.14 Since then, until end-2017, the rate has gradually fallen (by over 7 pp in 
cumulative terms). The causes of this decline have varied over time. During the recession, 
the reduction in the saving rate was linked to the need to maintain spending on essential 
goods and services against the background of a heavy decline in household income. 
Greater uncertainty led households to defer a substantial portion of their consumption 
decisions, but not those taken to meet their most basic needs.15
Several aspects of the recovery are estimated to have prompted a sustained 
reduction in household saving. Specifically, the improved labour market situation has 
contributed to diminishing the need for precautionary saving. Set against the increase in 
employment and income, and the reduction in uncertainty, households have stepped up 
their purchases of consumer goods and services and, in particular, they have satisfied the 
spending decisions they deferred during the crisis, which has led to a progressive 
absorption of pent-up demand.16 Moreover, the low level of interest rates may have 
lessened saving incentives, and the favourable financial conditions have boosted debt-
fuelled consumption. Finally, the recovery has coincided with an increase in the share of 
labour income in total income, a factor that is estimated to have likewise contributed to 
spurring a reduction in the saving rate, given that the marginal propensity to consume of 
labour income is greater than in the case of the remaining sources of income.17
Looking ahead, the room for households to further reduce their saving appears to be 
limited. Following the cumulative declines, the current level of the saving rate stands 
somewhat below the pre-crisis level. However, it should be borne in mind that the 
significant decline in household debt has lessened the portion of saving earmarked for 
repaying this debt and that it may now be allocated to current spending. For these 
purposes, an alternative definition may be considered of the saving rate that discounts 
therefrom an estimate of the payments made by households under the heading of debt 
repayment. Under this definition, the saving rate would still be 2 pp above its 2008 low, 
reflecting the deleveraging undertaken by the sector in the period since. 
Households posted a net borrowing requirement in 2017, after having recorded a net 
lending capacity since 2009 Q2, against the background of a significant rise in residential 
investment. Investment in housing increased by 8.3% last year (3.9 pp up on a year earlier), 
assisted by the strength of employment creation and propitious financial conditions. Moreover, 
the momentum of demand from abroad continued, since the fall-off in British buyers was 
offset by the acquisitions made by residents of other countries. The rise in residential 
investment, in the above-mentioned setting of diminished saving, led households to cease to 
be net lenders to the other sectors in the economy. Specifically, households’ net borrowing 
requirements amounted to 0.3% of GDP in 2017, in contrast to the net lending capacity of 
1.6% at end-2016 or the average of over 3% in the two years spanning 2014 and 2015. 
14  Ó. Arce, E. Prades and A. Urtasun (2013), “Changes in household saving and consumption in Spain during the 
crisis”, Economic Bulletin, September, Banco de España find as a possible cause of the decline in the saving 
rate since 2010 the existence of minimum consumption thresholds for certain goods.
15  See the Analytical Article “The recovery of private consumption in Spain by product type and household”, 
Economic Bulletin, 2/2017, Banco de España. J. González Mínguez and A. Urtasun (2015), “Consumption 
dynamics in Spain by product type”, Economic Bulletin, September, Banco de España, document the differential 
impact of the crisis on various categories of goods and services, finding that durable goods and non-essential 
goods and services underwent notably sharper falls in the crisis (and likewise far higher increases in the 
recovery) than other staple products or products whose consumption it is not possible to adjust (e.g. owing to 
the existence of contractual obligations). 
16  See Box 4 of ”Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 4/2017, Banco de España.
17  G. de Bondt, A. Gieseck and Z. Zekaite (2018), “Forecasting euro area private consumption using thick 
modelling”, ECB, mimeo.
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The favourable trend of business profits has continued to spur investment by non-
financial corporations (NFCs). On National Accounts data, the sector’s gross operating 
surplus is estimated to have retained its forceful dynamism in 2017, increasing by 5.5%, a 
slightly lesser pace than that of the previous year (see Chart 1.8.1). In terms of gross 
corporate saving, the slowdown was greater, dipping from 10.8% to 5.6%, which is due 
both to the rise in dividends paid and to the impact of the changes in corporate income 
tax.18
As in the case of households, the financing conditions of NFCs, both in terms of the 
cost and availability of funds, remains supportive of spending decisions. The cost of 
borrowed funds has held at historically low levels, with a further slight decline in the case 
of loans of less than €1 million, the segment in which operations with SMEs are concentrated 
(see Chart 1.5.1). The Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) evidences a 
further improvement in access to credit by small companies, such that the percentage of 
Spanish SMEs reporting themselves to be financially constrained stands below 9%, in line 
with the euro area average (see Chart 1.5.3). 
This context has been conducive to the continued expansion of new borrowing 
business. The pick-up in activity in the credit market was particularly pronounced in the 
segment encompassing SMEs (see Chart 1.5.4). In terms of stocks, the increase in the 
volume of new business has led the rate at which credit to resident NFCs was slipping to 
ease slightly over the course of 2017 (from 1.1% at end-2016 to 0.6% a year later).19 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Includes net capital transfers.
The benign financial conditions and the improved financial position of NFCs were conducive to growth in business investment, against a backdrop of 
strong final demand. High income generation in the sector meant that, despite the investment momentum, net lending remained high.
FINAL DEMAND AND FAVOURABLE FINANCIAL CONDITIONS CONTINUED TO DRIVE INVESTMENT 
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18  The information from the Central Balance Sheet Data Office likewise points to a dynamic behaviour of profits 
for the case of large corporations, with ordinary profit growth of 7.4%. See the Analytical Article “Results of 
non-financial corporations to 2017 Q4: preliminary year-end data”.
19  In June 2017, a credit institution conducted an intra-group operation under which the loans granted to a real 
estate subsidiary were converted into parent company equity holdings. As a result, there was a 1.6% decline in 
the outstanding balance of credit to NFCs. Had this operation not taken place, the year-on-year growth rate of 
credit extended to NFCs in December 2017 would have been 1.6 pp higher.
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Fixed-income financing was notably buoyant, particularly in the first half of 2017, 
contributing to making the flow of external financing (credit from resident institutions, 
fixed-income securities and external loans), in the year as a whole, positive for the first 
time since 2010. As a result, the weight of fixed-income financing in the total has increased, 
thereby providing continuity to the bank disintermediation initiated further to the crisis 
which, in the most recent period, has been boosted by, inter alia, the ECB’s Corporate 
Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) launched in June 2016.20
Another significant factor of support for non-financial corporations’ investment 
decisions has been the strengthening of their financial position. The sector’s aggregate 
debt ratio continued to fall in 2017, standing at year-end at 78% of GDP, similar to the euro 
area average, when it was almost 40 pp above this level in mid-2010. This reduction in 
debt, combined with a slight decrease in the average cost of its outstanding balance, 
translated into a further reduction in the debt burden ratio which, set against the figure of 
6% in early 2009, stood below 2% of GDP. This historically low level, along with the decline 
in debt, explains the low degree of financial pressure borne by the sector as a whole (see 
Chart 1.6.2). 
The favourable financial conditions and the improvement in corporate balance 
sheets were conducive to investment by non-financial corporations increasing in 
2017 by around 5% in real terms.21 This rate of increase, while high, was slightly below 
the average for the first three years of the recovery. As has been the case throughout this 
period, the buoyancy of business investment spending has continued to be underpinned 
by the momentum of final demand, whose growth, at 3.3%, was once again very similar to 
that averaged during the previous three years (see Chapter 3 of this Report).22 The increase 
in investment once again significantly exceeded fixed-capital consumption; however, 
capacity utilisation continued to increase throughout the year on the back of the strength 
of demand. As a result, the sector continued to show a notable lending capacity, of 2.9% 
of GDP (see Chart 1.8.2), reflecting the ongoing balance sheet restructuring at non-
financial corporations as a whole.
Exports accelerated slightly in 2017, albeit to a lesser extent than their end-markets. 
Goods and services exports increased by 5% over the year as a whole (see Chart 1.9.1). This 
rate, 0.2 pp up on the previous year, was slightly lower than that posted by external markets. 
These developments were in contrast to 2016, when exports to the rest of the world outgrew 
end-markets by more than 2 pp. The pattern of diminished relative buoyancy of exports 
compared with their scale variable is shared when regard is had to the breakdown between 
the euro area and the rest of the world; that suggests that several factors other than the 
appreciation of the exchange rate recorded last year may be at play, an appreciation which, 
vis-à-vis the non-euro area developed countries, was 2.4% in nominal effective terms.23
20  O. Arce, R. Gimeno and S. Mayordomo (2017), “Making room for the needy: the credit reallocation effects of the 
ECB’s corporate QE”, Documento de Trabajo, no. 1743, Banco de España, document the effects of the CSPP 
on the financing of Spanish firms. In particular, the announcement of the programme led large corporations to 
replace bank loans with debt issues. In turn, the fall in these corporations’ demand for credit enabled an 
increase in that granted to smaller firms, which do not usually have the capacity to gain access to primary 
corporate debt markets.
21  This rate is an in-house estimate, since National Accounts offer this magnitude solely in nominal terms.
22  Chapter 3 of this Annual Report analyses in detail the trend of investment in equipment and intangibles during 
the current recovery phase. The determinants of the sound behaviour of these variables include most notably 
the easing of financial conditions, the availability of own funds, diminished uncertainty and the fact the business 
sector was more export-oriented.
23  Analysis of contributions to export growth by the various explanatory variables suggest that the factors not 
included in the equations made a zero contribution to the increase in sales abroad, unlike 2016, when they had 
contributed 3 pp (see Chart 1.9.2).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 39 ANNUAL REPORT, 2017 1. THE RECOVERY IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY: THE LIMITS OF DEMAND-SIDE POLICIES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
Goods exports were the sole foreign sales component that accelerated. Specifically, 
goods exports to the rest of the world grew by 5%, 1.9 pp up on 2016 (see Chart 1.9.3). In 
2017 the base of firms that started exporting expanded significantly, although there was 
some easing in the rise in the number of regular exporters (understood to be those that 
have been exporting for at least four years; see Chart 1.9.4). In any event, the increase 
recorded since the onset of the crisis in the number of companies that regularly export 
provides structural support to sales abroad. In particular, the empirical evidence suggests 
that firms generally begin to export on a small scale, increasing the volume subsequently, 
once they see that their products are successful in end-markets.24 This mechanism would 
account for growth in the volume of exports by companies already established in foreign 
markets, even though the enlargement of the export base were to be checked.
As in 2016, the tourism services component of exports was notable for its greater 
dynamism. These services grew by 8.5%, 1.2 pp down on the previous year. The 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Using the export equation of the Banco de España's satellite model for the foreign sector.
b Regular exporters are those that have exported in the year concerned and in each of the three immediately preceding years.
Export growth was slightly higher than in 2016. However, the rate of growth was lower than that of the external markets. By component, tourism services 
remained particularly robust, while by contrast other services weakened significantly. The continuing increase in the number of exporting firms had a 
positive impact on goods exports.
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24  See C. Arkolakis, T. Papageorgiou and O. Timoshenko (2018), “Firm Learning and Growth”, Review of Economic 
Dynamics, forthcoming.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 40 ANNUAL REPORT, 2017 1. THE RECOVERY IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY: THE LIMITS OF DEMAND-SIDE POLICIES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
continuing strength of this variable was underpinned, on the demand side, by the improved 
economic situation in the euro area countries and the increase in the proportion of tourists 
from other regions (whose average daily expenditure is higher) and, on the supply side, by 
the quality improvements to the services provided, which helps lure higher-spending 
visitors.25 Conversely, the depreciation of sterling would not seem to have exerted any 
significant impact on arrivals of British tourists, who are Spain’s main market.26 That said, 
since the final stretch of 2017, some weakening in tourist exports has been observed, 
linked possibly to the August terrorist attacks in Barcelona, to the subsequent period of 
uncertainty in Catalonia, and to the incipient recovery of competing destinations in the 
Mediterranean.27 This latter factor, along with the strength of the euro and dearer oil prices, 
suggests a more moderate growth outlook. Finally, the pace of exports of other services 
eased notably following their exceptional performance in 2016, centred on business 
services.28
Generally, the impact of Brexit on the Spanish economy in terms of trade flows 
appears so far to have been limited. In particular, exports to the United Kingdom do not 
appear to have suffered from the dearer prices caused by the depreciation of sterling, 
since they have not behaved differently to those whose end-destination is the EU as a 
whole, except as regards consumer goods sales, especially of cars.29
The pace of imports accelerated in 2017. Purchases abroad rose to a rate of 4.7% 
(1.2 pp up on 2016), partly in response to the fact that the growth rate of final demand was 
somewhat higher, but above all to an increase in the elasticity observed between both 
variables compared with previous years. In any event, the elasticity observed stood below 
its average historical value (see Chart 1.10.1), in keeping with the microeconomic evidence 
suggesting the existence of signs of an incipient process involving the replacement of 
imported inputs by domestically produced ones.30 In turn, the rise in the elasticity of 
imports to final demand during 2017 might be partly attributable to the fact that the 
composition of this latter aggregate was skewed to a greater extent towards more import 
content-intensive variables, such as investment in capital goods and in intangible assets, 
and exports. 
The lending capacity of the economy as a whole declined slightly to 2% of GDP (see 
Chart 1.11.1). Maintaining positive balances vis-à-vis the rest of the world over a prolonged 
period is an unavoidable requisite for reducing the Spanish economy’s high external debt. 
In this respect, the fact that the sharp expansion in domestic demand throughout the 
recovery phase is proving compatible with relatively high external surpluses is a positive 
feature of the current expansionary cycle.31 In 2017, the merchandise trade deficit widened 
25  For a classification of the tourist offer, see “The Travel &Tourism Competitiveness Report 2017”, World Economic 
Forum (2017). For greater details about the recent course of the tourism export determinants, see Box 7 
“Dynamism of non-resident tourism in 2016 and its determinants”, in the “Quarterly report on the Spanish 
economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2017, Banco de España.
26  See Box 3 in the ”Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 2/2017, Banco de España.
27  There were significant increases in 2017 in tourist arrivals in North Africa and the Middle East, with year-on-year 
rates climbing by around 8 pp. For an assessment of the impact of the changes in tourist flows towards Spain as a 
result of the trend in these alternative destinations, see Box 7 “Dynamism of non-resident tourism in 2016 and its 
determinants”, in the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2017, Banco de España. 
28  See Box 7 “Net exports of non-tourism services in Spain since 2008” “Quarterly report on the Spanish 
economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2018, Banco de España.
29  See Analytical Article, “Un análisis de la expansión comercial de las empresas españolas en el Reino Unido”, 
Boletín Económico, Banco de España, forthcoming.
30  See Chapter 3 of the Annual Report, 2016, Banco de España.
31  Chapter 3 of the Annual Report, 2016, Banco de España, contains an estimate of the structural component of 
the external balance.
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by 0.3 pp to 1.9% of GDP, which chiefly reflected the worsening of the real terms of trade 
(affecting energy products, in step with dearer oil, and non-energy products alike), while 
the non-energy balance improved significantly in real terms, for the first time since 2013 
(see Chart 1.11.2). This fall in the merchandise balance was partly countered by an 
improvement in the surplus on services – linked above all to the increase in tourism exports 
– and by a further slight reduction in the deficit on the income balance, assisted by the 
environment of low interest rates. 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Using the import equation of the Banco de España's satellite model for the foreign sector.
Following the unusually low value observed in 2016, the elasticity of imports to final demand rose in 2017. However, it remains low compared with 
historical values, tending to confirm that the competitive gains achieved by the economy are giving rise to a certain degree of import substitution.
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SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
The current account surplus was very similar to that of 2016, against a backdrop of worsening real terms of trade but with an improving real non-energy 
balance. As for the sectoral balances, both the disappearance of household net lending and the decline in the general government deficit are notable, 
while non-financial corporations again recorded high net lending.
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From a sectoral perspective, the strength of activity was across the board. Among 
the main sectors, value added grew most in construction, by 4.9%, the highest rate since 
2001. From a more medium-term standpoint, value added in services as a whole was 
almost 9% higher than its pre-crisis level at end-2017, while in construction it is 40% 
lower, posting a very similar performance in industry (see Chart 1.12). Compared 
internationally, this pattern is in contrast to that in countries such as Germany, where value 
added in industry and construction is significantly higher than that observed in 2008. 
Job creation remained robust. Numbers employed increased by 2.8% in 2017 (see 
Chart 1.13.1), meaning that, since the end-2013 low, more than 1.9 million jobs have been 
created. However, the current level is still 10.4% down on that prevailing in early 2008, 
when the historical high in occupation was recorded. This intense job creation process has 
contributed to reducing the high unemployment significantly. Specifically, at end-2017, the 
unemployment rate stood at 16.5%, more than 10 pp below its early-2013 peak (see 
Chart 1.13.2), but still some distance off the euro area average (8.6%). The reduction in 
unemployment has also been assisted by the changes in the working population, where 
the declining trend of recent years continued in 2017. This chiefly reflected an increase in 
the weight of the oldest population groups, against a background of progressive population 
ageing, alleviated partly by the rise in the participation rate of the oldest groups. The 
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In 2017 industry value added was similar to the pre-crisis level, whereas services value added was 10% higher and construction value added was 40% 
lower. In terms of international comparison, since the start of the downturn the rate of growth of the services sector has been very similar to that observed 
in Germany or France. There are larger differences in industry, where Spain has underperformed in comparison with both Germany and France, and 
especially in construction, reflecting the sharp correction observed in Spain.
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Banco de España.
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incidence of long-term unemployment (i.e. the definition that considers those individuals 
who have been seeking a job for more than one year) declined to 50.4% at end-2017, a 
rate which, after the cumulative reduction over the past three years of over 10 pp, is very 
similar to the euro area average (see Chart 1.13.3). Nonetheless, the incidence of long-
term unemployment remains very high among certain groups, in particular among the least 
skilled (56.3%). 
Employment generation was sharper in some of the sectors that had experienced 
greater destruction at the onset of the crisis. Thus, according to the EPA (Spanish 
Labour Force Survey), employment grew by over 5% in construction and by around 3% 
both in industry and in market services, while in non-market services it increased by 
scarcely more than 1%. Moreover, some slowing was observed in some of the services 
activities that had been most buoyant in previous years, such as hotels and restaurants, 
transport and distribution. Overall, however, if the structure of employment by productive 
sector at end-2017 is compared with that prevailing pre-crisis, the weight of services can 
be seen to have gained 9 pp, equally distributed between market and non-market services, 
at the expense of industry (-2 pp) and construction (-7 pp).
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As has been the case since the start of the recovery, productivity growth was very low. Thanks to job creation and the decline in the labour force, the 
unemployment rate continued to fall, although to a lesser extent among workers with longer spells of unemployment. The percentage of employees with 
temporary contracts continued to increase, and the percentage of those working shorter than usual hours continued to decline.
SOURCE: INE.
a Employment as per Quarterly National Accounts. Full-time equivalent jobs.
b Long-term unemployed: persons who have been unemployed for a year or more. Incidence: proportion of total unemployed who have been unemployed for a 
year or more.
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Strong job creation has moved in step with a very modest increase in wage 
remuneration throughout the recovery phase. During the 2014-2017 period, the annual 
growth of economy-wide compensation per employee averaged 0.4% (see Chart 1.14.1). 
In 2017 this rate was 0.1 %. The increase in the market sectors, the scale of which was 
0.1 pp higher, was the outcome of the opposite behaviour of the two main components. 
On one hand, wages negotiated under collective bargaining agreements grew by 1.4% 
(0.4 pp up on 2016).32 On the other, these increases were offset by the portion of wage 
growth not attributable to collective bargaining, i.e. the component known as wage drift, 
whose contribution to the growth of compensation per employee was -1.5 pp, of a similar 
magnitude to that estimated for 2016.
The negative contribution of wage drift mainly reflects composition effects in the flow 
of employment generation. Negative drift is occurring in an environment of very low rates 
of increase in apparent labour productivity. From the standpoint of workers’ individual 
characteristics, one factor simultaneously limiting aggregate wage increases and 
productivity would appear to be the increase in the weight of new entries in the total 
numbers employed, given that the more limited job tenure of the former is associated with 
a lower-than-average wage level (and presumably productivity level). Specifically, on 
information from Social Security records, available to 2016, it is estimated that the greater 
weight of newcomers has contributed to reducing average compensation by somewhat 
more than 0.5 pp in each of the three years of the 2014-2016 period (see Chart 1.14.2). This 
effect is estimated to have been partly countered by other changes in the characteristics of 
workers that operate in the opposite direction, such as the rise in the average age of the 
working population or the increase in the average level of educational attainment. In 
addition, there is some evidence that, given the characteristics of the job and of the person 
employed, the wage difference between those who have been in the job for respectively 
more and less than one year has increased since the crisis (see Chart 1.14.3).33
Set against the significance of individual characteristics, the changes in the sectoral 
composition of employment creation appear to play a secondary role when explaining 
the low increases in aggregate wages and productivity. Employment creation is falling 
more than proportionately in sectors where the level of productivity is lower. However, the 
magnitude of this effect on wages is small. Specifically, the estimated contribution of the 
change in the sectoral composition of employment to the growth of compensation per 
employee in the market economy in cumulative terms from 2014 to 2017 was 0.4 pp.
In early 2017, an 8% rise in the minimum wage was approved, followed by a further 
increase of 4% in 2018. The increase approved for 2017, which directly affected somewhat 
more than 3% of wage-earners, is estimated to be exerting a limited aggregate effect both 
on employment and on wages.34 Nonetheless, on the evidence available for other, past 
increases in the minimum wage, the impact on the probability of job loss might be 
significant for certain specific groups of workers, such as youths and the elderly, insofar as 
3.2  COSTS AND PRICES 
CONTINUED TO EVIDENCE 
LOW RATES OF INCREASE
32  Specifically, wage settlements were higher in newly signed agreements (1.8%) than in revised agreements, 
which usually react more slowly to the changes in wage determinants and which on this occasion, too, reflected 
to a lesser extent the labour market improvement and the rise in consumer prices.
33  See the Economic Note «La evolución del empleo y del paro en el primer trimestre de 2017, según la Encuesta 
de Población Activa”, Boletín Económico, 2/2017, Banco de España. Specifically, the wage gap, once controlled 
for by the differences in observable characteristics, between workers already present in the labour market and 
new entries, rose from approximately 9% in 2008 to 15.3% in 2016. This gap has widened, in part owing to the 
drop in the number of hours worked per employee.
34  See Box 5 “The effects of the recent rise in the minimum wage on employment and wages” in the “Quarterly 
report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2017, Banco de España.
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they may have, on average, a lower level of productivity. These effects may be exacerbated 
in future given that, in addition to the minimum-wage increases that have already been 
introduced, a path of additional rises has been agreed to raise the minimum wage by 2020 
to an amount comprising 14 payments per annum of €850.35
The low rate of increase in wages and productivity translated into a virtual stability 
of unit labour costs (ULCs), albeit on a rising profile over the course of the year. ULCs 
increased by 0.2% in annual average terms in the market economy. However, this variable 
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SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a The unconditional pay gap is defined as the percentage wage difference between a worker with length of service of less than one year and all other workers. The 
conditional pay gap is estimated using a wage equation that controls for differences between both groups of workers by sex, age, level of education, nationality, 
sector of activity and firm size.
b Nominal wage is the compensation per employee according to Quarterly National Accounts. The nominal wage deflator is the CPI.
Negotiated wages accelerated moderately, but wage drift again made a highly negative contribution to growth in compensation per employee, reflecting, 
among other factors, the lower pay levels of new labour market entrants. In addition, the difference between wage levels of individuals with respective job 
tenure of more or less than one year has increased since the crisis.
35  In each of the two years covering the period 2019-2020, these increases are conditional upon real GDP growth 
being higher than 2.5%, and increases in average Social Security registrations exceeding 450,000 people. 
Should these increases materialise, there would be a 20% rise in the minimum wage from €707 in 2017 to €850 
in 2020 (in both cases in 14 payments per annum).
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has been rising since mid-2016, reflecting a modest acceleration in wages, which in turn 
might be related to the reduction in the degree of cyclical slack and, in particular, to the 
ongoing decline in unemployment. Looking ahead, it seems likely that composition effects 
will continue to give rise to negative drift and to low increases in productivity. However, the 
gradual improvement in the labour market might continue to exert upward pressure on 
wage settlements, which would translate into some acceleration in compensation per 
employee and, therefore, in ULCs.
Domestic prices increased at moderate rates, albeit higher than the previous year, 
which is consistent with the gradual reduction in cyclical slack. Specifically, the 
value-added deflator in the market economy, which is a measure of domestic inflationary 
pressures, continued to quicken moderately during 2017, extending the trend observed 
in the final stretch of 2016 (see Chart 1.15.1). In annual average terms, the rate of 
change of the value-added deflator in the market economy increased by 0.9 pp to 1.2% 
in 2017, a movement to which, as indicated, the rising path of ULC growth contributed. 
But the acceleration in domestic prices was in response, moreover, to the higher growth 
of the gross operating surplus per unit of value added, which rose by 2.4%. Reflecting 
these developments was the increase in mark-ups, which grew by 1% when measured 
by the difference between the respective rates of change of the value-added deflator 
and of ULCs (for the market economy), which points to the advisability of exploring 
possible avenues for raising the degree of competition in some goods and services 
markets, as discussed in Box 1.2 and in Section 5.2 in this Chapter, and in Box 3.4 of 
Chapter 3.
The acceleration in final demand prices over the year as a whole was more 
pronounced, given the rise in the contribution of the external component. The imports 
deflator quickened by somewhat less than 6 pp to a growth rate of 4.4% (see Chart 1.15.2). 
This largely reflected significantly dearer oil and other commodities on international 
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The value added deflator of the market economy again recorded a low rate of growth, although with an increasing profile throughout the year, thanks to 
the contribution both of ULCs and the unit surplus. The final demand deflator accelerated in annual average terms, but with a decreasing profile, owing 
to the deceleration in the import deflator.
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markets, which was countered only marginally by the exchange rate appreciation. That 
said, the  annual average increase in commodities – 24% in the case of crude oil measured 
in dollars – masks a strongly diminishing profile over the course of the year, which explains 
why the imports deflator slowed from 6.4% in Q1 to 2.8% in Q4. 
Given the course of domestic and external inflationary pressures described, the final 
demand deflator accelerated from -0.2% in 2016 to 1.8% in 2017, with a similar 
trajectory to consumer prices. Specifically, the CPI grew at an annual average rate of 
2%, compared with the declines of several tenths of a percentage point in each of the 
three previous years (see Chart 1.16.1). Nonetheless, the year 2017 as a whole masks a 
clearly declining annual profile, from 3% in January to 0.6% in the same month in 2018, 
following which something of a rise began. This trajectory was, as in the case of the 
imports deflator, much determined by the energy component. Indeed, the strong rise in the 
overall inflation rate at the start of 2017 was due mainly to the comparison effect resulting 
DownloadEXCEL
Excel
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
 ENERGY UNPROCESSED FOOD  OTHER  CPI
1  CPI. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE YEAR-ON-YEAR RATE
% and pp
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
 NON-ENERGY INDUSTRIAL
 PROCESSED FOOD
 SERVICES
 CPI EXCLUDING UNPROCESSED FOOD AND ENERGY
% and pp
2  CPI EXCLUDING UNPROCESSED FOOD AND ENERGY.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE YEAR-ON-YEAR RATE
CONSUMER PRICES ROSE SHARPLY AT THE START OF THE YEAR BUT THE RATE OF GROWTH 
THEN SLOWED
CHART 1.16
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
3  HICP. SPAIN AND EURO AREA
% and pp
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
% and pp
4  CORE INFLATION. SPAIN AND EURO AREA
SOURCES: European Commission, INE and Banco de España.
After climbing markedly at the beginning of 2017, consumer prices decelerated, owing especially to the energy component and, to a lesser extent, to the 
core component. The differential vis-à-vis the euro area narrowed but remained positive for most of the year, reflecting the performance of the energy 
component. In the case of the core indicator, the differential oscillated around zero.
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from the notable fall in oil prices just one year earlier.36 But, despite the rise in oil prices, 
the persistence of the high inflation of the energy component was limited, owing to the 
comparison effect of the opposite sign derived from the rises observed as from February 
2016.
Core inflation continued to post very moderate figures. The rate of change of core-
component consumer prices (encompassing non-energy industrial goods, services and 
processed food) remained very low. While over the year as a whole the growth of the CPI 
excluding unprocessed food and energy was 0.3 pp up on 2016, at 1.1%, it moved on a 
declining course in the second half of the year, ending 2017 at 0.8% (see Chart 1.16.2). 
This slowdown, which was more marked in the case of non-energy industrial goods than 
it was for services, contrasts with the reduction in the degree of slack in the economy, 
which a priori should have prompted a heightening of domestic inflationary pressures. It is 
estimated that this factor has been dominated by another two factors of the opposite sign: 
the appreciation of the exchange rate – which might continue contributing to upholding 
very moderate inflationary pressures in the short term, given the lagged transmission of 
exchange rate movements – and some pass-through to domestic producer prices of the 
lower external inflationary pressures stemming from the slowdown in oil prices. 
The consumer price inflation differential with the euro area narrowed during the 
year as the energy component slowed. The rise in the energy component at the start of 
2017 was much sharper in Spain, which was due both to the fact that the oscillations in oil 
prices have a greater impact in our country on final fuel prices (given the lesser weight of 
ad valorem taxation) and to the rise in the cost of electricity in early 2017 (see Chart 1.16.3).37 
The differential in terms of the indicator that excludes energy prices was slightly positive 
throughout most of the year (at around 0.1 pp), but changed sign in December (-0.1 pp) 
(see Chart 1.16.4). In March 2018 the differential was zero.
The Spanish economy has completed a growth phase of more than four years. Since 
late 201338, GDP has grown by almost 13% in cumulative terms, exceeding the pre-crisis 
level since mid-2017. In per capita terms, end-2017 GDP was almost 1% above the 2007 
level, recouping a portion of the cumulative loss vis-à-vis the average for the euro area 
countries during the crisis. 
The share of the domestic and external components of demand in output is 
proving more balanced than in previous expansionary phases. One positive 
characteristic of the Spanish economy during this period has been the fact that the 
absorption of the economy’s idle resources, which is still under way, is proving 
compatible with a high external balance. Initially, the improvement in activity was 
export-led, thanks to the recovery of the competitiveness lost in the previous upturn, 
with the various domestic demand components subsequently joining the expansionary 
process (see Figure 1.1).39
4  A provisional 
assessment of the 
recovery: 
achievements and 
limits 
4.1  A PROLONGED AND 
BALANCED RECOVERY 
PHASE 
36  For an explanation of the comparison effect, see Box 3 of the ”Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, 
Economic Bulletin, December 2016, Banco de España.
37  See the Analytical Article “The effect of oil price fluctuations on Spanish inflation”, Economic Bulletin, 2/2017, 
Banco de España.
38  The “Spanish Business Cycle Dating Committee of the Spanish Economic Association” (see http://asesec.org/
CFCweb/) dates the end of the Spanish economy’s double-dip recession at 2013 Q2, one quarter later than the 
end of the recession in the euro area, dated in turn by the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the Centre for 
Economic Policy Research (CEPR).
39  Chapter 2 of the Annual Report, 2015, Banco de España contains an account of the sequence whereby the 
various demand components joined the recovery in the economy.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 49 ANNUAL REPORT, 2017 1. THE RECOVERY IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY: THE LIMITS OF DEMAND-SIDE POLICIES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
SOURCE: Banco de España.
CHARACTERISTICS AND STRENGTHS OF RECOVERY (2013-17)
EXPLANATORY FACTORS  AND STRENGTHS
AREAS OF REFORM
STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN THE DOWNTURN AND PARTIAL 
CORRECTION OF IMBALANCES
Competitiveness gains, with recurrent external surpluses
Correction of weight of real estate sector
Labour market and pension system reform
Restructuring of financial system
Significant reduction in private indebtedness
ADDRESS CHALLENGE OF POPULATION AGEING
Policies to ensure sustainability of pension system
Higher labour force participation and employment. Productivity gains
Migration policy. Policies to encourage higher birth rate
EXOGENOUS FACTORS
Lower oil prices
More dynamic external 
markets
PROVISIONAL ASSESSMENT OF RECOVERY (2013-17)
Strength attributable both to temporary 
and more structural factors
DEMAND POLICY 
STIMULUS
Conventional and 
unconventional 
monetary policy
Expansionary fiscal policy
VULNERABILITIES AND CHALLENGES
Unemployment rate remains high
Large net debtor position vis-à-vis the rest of the world
High level of public indebtedness and structural deficit
Inefficiencies in operation of labour and goods and services markets
Population ageing: a key challenge for potential growth and public expenditure
Low average productivity
CONTINUE WITH FISCAL CONSOLIDATION PROCESS 
Compliance with fiscal targets in accordance with Stability Pact
Composition of adjustment conducive to growth
Reform of regional government financing system
BOOST LABOUR MARKET EFFICIENCY
Reduction in temporary contracts. Work-life balance policies
Wage-setting mechanisms more geared to firm and sector-specific conditions
IMPROVE PRODUCTIVITY DYNAMICS
Need to invest in human capital
Policies to promote innovation
PROMOTE REFORMS AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL
Completion of banking union: a) common backstop for resolution process; b) European deposit insurance scheme
Development of joint issues or sovereign bond-backed securities
Fiscal policy: a) supranational instruments to address adverse shocks; b) reform of governance and fiscal rules
Balance between domestic 
and external demand
Employment 
intensive
In 2017 GDP returned
to its pre-crisis level
SPANISH ECONOMIC RECOVERY: CONSTRAINTS ON ROLE OF DEMAND POLICIES AND FUTURE 
CHALLENGES
FIGURE 1.1
VULNERABILITIES PERSIST - A BROAD REFORM AGENDA IS NEEDED
REMOVE REGULATORY BARRIERS AND INCREASE COMPETITION
Effective application of Market Unity Law
Review of regulatory thresholds that penalise firms' growth
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 50 ANNUAL REPORT, 2017 1. THE RECOVERY IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY: THE LIMITS OF DEMAND-SIDE POLICIES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
Output growth is proving more job creation-intensive. The strong employment creation 
in the current upturn is in step with the usual pattern of other expansionary phases of the 
Spanish economy, although on this occasion the dynamism of this variable has also been 
assisted by the wage moderation observed following the crisis and the effects of the 
labour reforms. Another difference with previous recovery phases is a sectoral composition 
more tilted towards the services sector.
The structural reforms set in train during the recession contributed to laying the 
foundations of the recovery. Overall, the various measures adopted allowed national and 
foreign agents to regain their confidence in the Spanish economy. Notable among the main 
reforms are those involving the labour market, which added further flexibility to the possibilities 
of adjusting firms’ labour costs in contractionary periods, and the recapitalisation and restructuring 
of credit institutions. Other significant structural changes were the successive reforms to the 
pension system, progress in ongoing fiscal consolidation and the new national framework of 
fiscal rules. In the European arena, the various institutional measures and advances in recent 
years, which notably include the start-up of the Banking Union, have also contributed to shoring 
up confidence in the common euro project, which has been propitious to the normalisation of 
financing conditions within the euro area and the correction of its fragmented financial markets. 
Moreover, a series of more transitory – though persistent – factors also contributed 
to the dynamism of the recovery. These factors include most notably the role played by 
the ECB’s monetary policy and, in 2015 and 2016, the application of an expansionary 
fiscal policy, joined by the significant reduction in oil prices from mid-2014 to early 2016 
and, more recently, the improvement in foreign markets.40
Overall, notable progress has been made in recent years in correcting some of the 
Spanish economy’s disequilibria. These imbalances built up in the previous expansionary 
period, in terms of private-sector debt, dependence on external financing and losses in 
competitiveness.41 In addition to the above-mentioned reduction in the unemployment 
rate, the current cyclical phase has been underpinned by, and in turn has boosted, the 
ongoing recovery of the losses in competitiveness accumulated in terms of labour costs, 
the running of current account surpluses and the reduction in high private-sector debt. 
Progress, however, has been less in other areas, meaning that the economy still has 
elements of vulnerability. As set out in Section 5.1, there has been less headway in correcting 
other imbalances, including in particular high public indebtedness and the still-high net debtor 
position of the nation, despite the recent current account surpluses. Also, significant structural 
dysfunctions persist in the labour market and a pattern of growth more forcefully conducive 
to high-productivity and high-added-value activities has not yet taken root. And this against 
a background in which population ageing will significantly reduce the economy’s potential 
growth at the same time as it is posing far-reaching challenges regarding public pensions. 
Tackling these matters requires resolute reforms, as is detailed in Section 5.2.
The pick-up in the Spanish economy has been accompanied by a highly expansionary 
monetary policy stance. When, in mid-2014, the difficulties in fulfilling the medium-term 
price stability objective began to become discernible, the ECB Governing Council set 
about launching a broad range of measures aimed at ensuring the proper anchoring of 
4.2  TOWARDS A SCENARIO 
WITH A MORE LIMITED 
ROLE FOR MONETARY 
POLICY 
40  See Box 1.2 “The effect of temporary factors on recent developments in the Spanish economy: a comparison 
with the euro area”, in Chapter 1 of Annual Report 2016, Banco de España.
41  See “Report on the financial and banking crisis in Spain, 2008-2014”, Banco de España.
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inflation expectations around values consistent with the central bank’s objective and, more 
generally, at avoiding the adverse consequences of the prolongation over time of 
excessively low inflation.
The monetary stimuli have been underpinned by the joint action of conventional and 
unconventional instruments. The measures pursued since 2014 have included the use 
of tools other than policy interest rates, given the limited effectiveness of this instrument 
as a result of the proximity to its effective lower bound. Specifically, monetary measures 
have been pursued along four avenues: the setting of a negative interest rate for the 
deposit facility; communication policy and forward guidance; the application of specific 
programmes geared to making the transmission channel running through bank credit more 
fluid; and, finally, the implementation of the APP.
Monetary policy transmission to financial conditions and to demand has proven 
effective, reversing downward inflation expectations. Both negative interest rates 
and the injection of liquidity have provided for the maintenance of easy financial 
conditions, acting as a stimulus to credit and to household and corporate expenditure. 
Further, forward guidance has enabled the ECB to emphasise the continuity of its 
expansionary stance, increasing its effectiveness through the additional stimulus 
provided by the anchoring of agents’ expectations and the reduction in so-called 
interest rate term premia. This has been the case for policy rates, which will hold at 
current levels over a period that will stretch substantially beyond the conclusion of net 
asset purchases, for which there is no defined date. Moreover, the large size of the 
portfolio acquired under the APP42 and the reinvestment commitment over a long period 
after the conclusion of the net asset purchases are elements that also shape the 
expansionary stance of monetary policy, under whose influence the downside risks of 
the inflation projections have begun to be balanced out, as reflected by the rise since 
summer 2017 by the inflation expectations indicators based on financial market 
information.43
Monetary policy conduct has been a determining factor in the current economic 
expansionary phase, both in the euro area as a whole and in Spain. The measures 
adopted have significantly eased financial conditions. And, as illustrated in the estimates 
presented in Box 1.3, monetary policy has contributed notably to the growth of real GDP 
and of the CPI, both in the euro area and in Spain. 
Foreseeably, however, in the future monetary policy will begin to progressively play 
a more limited role. In the euro area, the gradual overcoming of the legacies of the crisis 
and a position further ahead in the cycle, with an output gap which, on available estimates, 
is expected to be positive as from 2018, will lead, according to the ECB forecasts, to a 
progressive recovery in inflation to levels compatible with medium-term price stability 
(which the monetary authority for the area establishes as an inflation rate lower than but 
close to 2%).44 As this normalisation of euro area price dynamics takes shape, it is to be 
expected that the exceptionally expansionary stance of monetary policy at present will 
gradually be tightened. 
42  Specifically, after three and a half years of uninterrupted purchases, the APP portfolio will amount to almost 
€2.6 trillion in September 2018, equivalent to 23% of euro area GDP. 
43  See the Analytical Article, “Euro area inflation expectations”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2018, Banco de España.
44  Specifically, according to the “March 2018 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area”, the HICP 
for the area as a whole will grow by 1.7%, on average, in 2020 (and by 1.8% in terms of the indicator that 
excludes the fresh food and energy component). 
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Fiscal policy temporarily stimulated growth in the 2015-2016 period, with a clearly 
expansionary stance. Having regard to the standard values of the fiscal multipliers, 
almost 1 pp of economic growth in 2015-2016 could be attributed to the impulse of 
budgetary policy,45 given that in those two years the structural primary budget deficit, 
which measures the budgetary policy stance, worsened – according to the European 
Commission’s latest estimates – by 2.5 pp. Despite this expansionary stance, the 
favourable cyclical conditions allowed for the continuation of the declining path of the 
budget deficit/GDP ratio (see Chart 1.17.1).
The fiscal policy stance in 2017 turned broadly neutral, following the approval and 
delayed entry into force of the budgetary plans. The reduction in the deficit was due to 
4.3  THE FISCAL 
CONSOLIDATION PROCESS 
SHOULD CONTINUE IN THE 
COMING YEARS 
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In 2015-16 fiscal policy remained clearly expansionary, before becoming almost neutral in 2017, but strong economic growth allowed the fiscal 
consolidation process that had begun in 2013 to continue, albeit at a much slower pace, and permitted a slight reduction in public debt. In 2017 the 
deficit target was met, thanks to modest growth in public revenue and, above all, to the moderation in expenditure. However, the structural deficit is still 
one of the highest in the euro area and debt is very far from the 60% of GDP target.
45  See Chapter 4 of the Annual Report, 2016, Banco de España.
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the cyclical improvement in the economy and to the fall-off in interest expenditure, while 
the structural primary balance held broadly stable, according to the latest European 
Commission estimates. The high rate of increase of nominal output allowed the effects of 
the still-high public debt/GDP ratio to be more than offset, meaning that the ratio once 
again posted a slight reduction to 98.3%, 0.7 pp less than in 2016 (see Chart 1.17.2). The 
budget deficit stood last year at 3.1% of GDP, a rate matching the objective set under the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The reduction 
in the aggregate deficit was extensive to the different tiers of government, whereby Central 
Government, the Social Security System and Regional Government posted deficits of 
1.9%, 1.5% and 0.3% of GDP, respectively, while Local Government once again recorded 
a surplus in 2017, at 0.6 pp, similar to that of the previous year.
Over the recovery phase as a whole, fiscal policy has been supported by the 
significant reduction in financing costs associated, inter alia, with the ECB’s 
monetary policy measures. In particular, it is estimated for Spain’s case that the reduction 
in financing costs will have had a direct impact on sovereign debt interest payments in the 
2014-2016 period that could be quantified at around 0.9 pp of GDP. Moreover, the positive 
macroeconomic effects of unconventional monetary policy on economic growth and 
inflation are expected to have indirectly affected the cyclical revenue and expenditure 
items of the public budget, entailing an additional reduction in the budget deficit during 
this period of around 0.9 pp.46
In the coming years fiscal policy should resume the reduction of the structural 
deficit. The European Commission has recommended a return to the neutral fiscal stance 
for the euro area as a whole in 2018, differing across Member States in terms of their fiscal 
room for manoeuvre. In Spain’s case, both the public debt/GDP ratio and the structural 
budget deficit are holding at levels some distance off the limits set in the SGP, which will 
require continuing with the fiscal consolidation process in the coming years (see Box 1.4). 
The positive assessment of the current recovery phase should not lead to the 
challenges outstanding being forgotten. As noted, the strength of the expansion has 
been underpinned, in part, by factors that will tend progressively to fade, particularly as 
regards demand-side (monetary and fiscal) policies. As these latter policies lose momentum, 
the measures aimed at improving the use and quality of productive factors and the efficient 
functioning of the markets for goods and factors should gain in prominence as a factor for 
shoring up medium- and long-term growth. There is consensus in the economic literature 
about the positive effects of reforms in periods of expansion, as the resistance and 
adjustment costs that such reforms entail can be better tackled.47 Also, in a monetary union 
with interest rates close to zero, the positive impact of the structural reforms undertaken in 
the peripheral countries may be amplified by an expansionary monetary policy.48
The economy maintains factors of vulnerability. While there has been substantial 
progress in the correction of some of the imbalances built up in the previous expansionary 
cycle, the economy remains exposed to specific shocks owing to the confluence of various 
4.4  THE LIMITS ON DEMAND-
SIDE POLICIES EVIDENCE 
THE NEED TO MAKE 
PROGRESS IN REDUCING 
VULNERABILITIES AND IN 
STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
46  See the Analytical Article “The impact of unconventional monetary policy on euro area public finances”, 
Economic Bulletin, 3/2017, Banco de España.
47  See “Structural policies in the euro area”, forthcoming as an ECB Occasional Paper, which contains a detailed 
discussion on the relationship between the cyclical position and reform costs.
48  See O. Arce, S. Hurtado and C. Thomas (2016), “Policy Spillovers and Synergies in a Monetary Union”, 
International Journal of Central Banking, September, and “Reducing income inequality while boosting economic 
growth: can it be done?”, Economic Policy Reforms, 2012, OECD.
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factors. Hence, although the high net external liabilities position has declined by 17 pp of 
GDP from its 2014 peak, public debt remains at towering levels and household and 
corporate debt are at high levels from a historical perspective despite the fact the available 
estimates point to the deleveraging needs for these sectors being already very low49 
following the significant progress made in recent years. The banking system continues to 
face significant challenges (as is described in detail in Chapter 2), and unemployment 
remains very high, while the quality of jobs created is, in many cases, improvable, given 
the high ratio of temporary to total employment, the maintenance of a high rate of unwanted 
part-time employment and the limited duration of employment contracts, while there are 
no appreciable changes in the wage-setting mechanism towards a greater sensitivity to 
firm-and sectoral-level conditions. Likewise, although inflationary pressures are proving 
moderate, such that gains in competitiveness continued to be achieved, the widening of 
business mark-ups suggests a potentially insufficient degree of competition in some 
sectors (see Box 1.2).
However, there are few initiatives to resolve the economy’s structural problems. A 
divided Parliament means it is currently difficult to set far-reaching legislative initiatives in 
train. It should be borne in mind that many of the tasks outstanding in the Spanish economy 
require courses of action in the medium and long term extending beyond the usual political 
cycle and, therefore, they need launching without delay and with extensive and lasting 
political backing behind them.
Furthermore, the experience of the crisis has evidenced the need for resolute headway 
in completing the Economic and Monetary Union, a pivotal aspect of the sustainability 
and stability of the growth of the Member States. In addition to correcting the still-
persisting macroeconomic imbalances, it is necessary to complete the Banking Union, to 
promote the creation of a true single market for capitals, to introduce budgetary mechanisms 
geared to aggregate stabilisation and to simplify the governance of fiscal rules.
After almost five years of strong growth, the persistently high level of external and 
public debt is a source of vulnerability. The intensity and nature of the economic 
expansion have corrected these imbalances to some extent. First, the aggregate 
expenditure of economic agents has been lower than their income, which has helped to 
contain net external debt. Second, the cyclical strength has helped to correct the budget 
deficit and, therefore, to check the growth of public debt. The low interest rates have been 
conducive to these adjustments. However, despite such favourable conditions, progress 
in reducing external and, especially, public debt remains modest.
The two imbalances are closely interrelated. At end-2017, the negative net international 
investment position (IIP) of the Spanish economy stood at 80.8% of GDP, 17 pp below the 
5  Challenges ahead
5.1  PERSISTENT EXTERNAL 
AND FISCAL IMBALANCES
49  In  its 2016 report for Spain the European Commission, in accordance with various alternative methodologies, 
estimated that household deleveraging needs stood at between 10-20 pp as at mid-2015, and those of firms, 
at less than 10 pp. However, it should be borne in mind that, between that date and end-2017, debt ratios fell 
by 10 pp in the case of households and by 12 pp in that of firms, meaning that deleveraging needs as at the 
latter date would foreseeably be much lower than the initial estimates. Moreover, applying the experience of 
past episodes of deleveraging, which shows that during these phases two-thirds of the previous increase in the 
corporate debt ratio and practically 100% of the household debt ratio were corrected, on average [see F. 
Bornhorst and M. A. Ruiz-Arranz (2013), “Indebtedness and Deleveraging in the Euro Area”, 2013 Article IV 
Consultation on Euro Area Polices: Selected Issues Paper, Chapter  3, IMF Country Report No. 13/206, 
Washington], and taking as the starting point the deleveraging process in 2002 Q3, which is when the average 
euro area levels were obtained, the outcome would be that deleveraging needs at the end of last year would be 
11 pp for households and zero for firms. In any event, these results should be viewed with caution given that 
the various methodologies used in these calculations are subject to certain constraints. 
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2014 peak (see Chart 1.18.1). This level, which is very high by international standards, 
means that Spanish agents’ income and financial position are more sensitive to changes 
in global financial conditions. The breakdown of the IIP by sector shows how, since the 
onset of the crisis, the general government’s net liability position has increased significantly, 
while that of financial institutions, firms and households has decreased. In recent years, 
vulnerability has been mitigated in part by the structural adjustment of the current account 
balance and the increase in the financial position of resident issuers50 (see Chart 1.18.2).
The continuation of high public debt levels over a prolonged period may have adverse 
effects on economic growth. These effects arise insofar as public debt absorbs funds 
that could be used for more productive purposes and alters the overall financing conditions 
of the economy, distorting private investment decisions. Moreover, in a setting of high 
public debt, fiscal policy may be subject to constraints owing to the need to support 
substantial primary deficits that require higher levels of taxation or lower levels of productive 
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non-residents, with the commitment to make in the future payments of principal, interest or both. It therefore includes debt securities, special drawing rights 
assigned, and deposits, loans, trade credit and other liabilities.
b A positive (negative) sign denotes an increase (decrease) in the net IIP.
c Valuation effects are gains/losses owing to the exchange rate and/or price of financial instruments, while other adjustments are other changes in volume, including 
in particular write-offs owing to recognition of the impossibility of recovering funds, reclassifications of assets and/or liabilities and changes in residence of holders 
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The negative net international investment position (IIP) has fallen to 80.8% of GDP, although it is still high by international standards. Since the onset of the 
crisis, the net debtor position of firms, households and financial institutions has decreased, while the general government contribution has increased.
50  A combination of factors have helped to reduce this vulnerability in recent years (see Chapter 3 of Banco de 
España Annual Report, 2016, and Ó. Arce (2017), “La posición de inversión internacional de la economía 
española: Tendencias, análisis y evaluación”, in «¿Es la economía española financieramente vulnerable?”, 
Documento de Trabajo nº 13, Fundación de Estudios Financieros. On the one hand, the structural adjustment 
of the current account balance in recent years, along with the return to normal in the financial markets and the 
restructuring of liabilities, have helped to temper the external vulnerability of the economy. On the other, 
valuation effects, which in recent years have reflected an improvement in the financial position of resident 
issuers, have limited the correction of the book value of the negative external position. Specifically, the 
improvement since 2012 in the solvency and prospective earnings of resident issuers has given rise to a 
revaluation of their liabilities, although, in terms of the IIP, this has negative valuation effects that increase the 
negative external balance.
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expenditure. At the same time, the countercyclical room for manoeuvre in fiscal policy to 
address adverse macroeconomic shocks may be significantly reduced in a high-debt 
scenario. In addition, this produces greater vulnerability to changes in investor (market) 
sentiment.51
Complying with European and national tax rules will require continued fiscal 
consolidation. Since 2013, Spain’s general government agencies have been subject to an 
EDP, in the framework of the corrective arm of the SGP. In August 2016 the EU Council 
updated the conditions for exit from the EDP in 2018. In particular, the general government 
deficit must be no higher than 2.2% of GDP in 2018 and the structural effort between 2016 
and 2018 at least 0.6 pp of GDP. Although it is very likely that Spanish general government 
agencies’ deficits will be below 3% in 2018, there is greater uncertainty regarding strict 
compliance with the degree of reduction required of the structural government deficit, 
which according to the European Commission would still be high (3.3% of potential GDP 
in 2018), the largest of the 19 euro area countries. Exiting the EDP would entail redefining 
the path of fiscal adjustment, to adapt to the requirements of the preventive arm of the 
SGP. These requirements include reducing the structural deficit at an annual rate of 0.5 pp 
in normal circumstances, until the medium-term equilibrium target is reached,52 and 
reducing the general government debt to GDP ratio per annum by one-twentieth of the 
distance from the medium-term benchmark of 60% (see Box 1.4).
Population ageing is a key challenge for the sustainability of public finances. The 
most recent estimates of the impact of population ageing on public expenditure on 
pensions, health care and long-term care show that it would increase expenditure over the 
next three decades, by a maximum of some 3.5 pp of GDP by around 2050.53 In the case 
of the pension system, in a favourable macroeconomic scenario, application of the 
sustainability factor, which links starting pension to the increase in life expectancy, and 
especially application of the annual pension revaluation index, which links increases in 
pension to the balance between the revenue and expenditure of the system, would 
gradually reduce the pension system’s current deficit (1.8% of GDP in 2018) and would 
significantly counter the effect of the expected rise in the dependency ratio in the long 
term. In the absence of additional increases in revenue, the adjustment would come mainly 
from a decrease in the replacement rate of public pensions, which could amount to 20 pp 
between 2013 and 2060.54 Looking forward, the key is to limit the replacement rates of the 
Spanish public pension system, in step with social preferences, to adapt them to revenues 
so as to ensure sustainability. The conclusion that may be drawn from the analyses 
available is that maintaining the present replacement rates, which are high by international 
standards, would require a very significant increase in pension system revenues. In any 
event, any reform strategy chosen should heighten the system’s transparency, strengthen 
the contributory principle, that is, the relationship between contributions and benefits, 
51  See P. Hernández de Cos, D. López-Rodríguez and J. J. Pérez (2018), “The challenges of public deleveraging”, 
Banco de España Occasional Paper 1803.
52  In the European tax framework, convergence towards the medium-term target is strengthened by application of 
the “expenditure rule”, which determines that public expenditure growth, after deducting extraordinary 
revenues, cannot exceed the medium-term potential GDP growth of the economy. For an overview of the 
European tax framework, see P. García-Perea and E. Gordo (2016), “Los mecanismos de supervisión 
presupuestaria de la UEM”, Economic Bulletin, March, Banco de España.
53  See The 2015 Ageing Report, European Commission, and Actualización del Programa de Estabilidad del Reino 
de España 2018-2021.
54  See R. Ramos (2014), “The new revaluation and sustainability factor of the Spanish pension system”, Economic 
Bulletin, July-August, Banco de España, and P. Hernández de Cos, J. F. Jimeno and R. Ramos (2017), “ The 
Spanish public pension system: current situation, challenges and reform alternatives”, Banco de España 
Occasional Paper 1701.
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and, in particular, maintain an automatic adjustment mechanism that ensures the 
sustainability of future pensions.
The fiscal consolidation process should be compatible with an improvement in the 
quality of public finances. The adjustment pending should be anchored to a medium-
term programme setting out the detailed measures that would allow the budgetary 
objectives to be met, and to a prudent macroeconomic and public revenue projection. In 
addition, the composition of the adjustment is particularly important, as it should seek to 
ensure that public finances make a greater contribution to the potential growth of the 
economy. On the expenditure side, according to the detailed analyses performed in some 
European economies, including Spain,55 there seems to be scope for further progress in 
increasing the efficiency of public expenditure and redirecting its composition towards 
those items that have a greater impact on the accumulation of physical, technological and 
human capital and, in consequence, on total factor productivity and economic growth in 
the long term.56 
On the revenue side, there is scope to consider an overhaul and redefinition of the 
basket of taxes, with a shift towards structures more conducive to potential growth. 
These structures should be underpinned by taxes that produce less distortion in the 
behaviour of economic agents and that allow sufficient revenue to be obtained, in a stable 
and efficient manner, to fund the desired level of public expenditure. It should be noted 
that taxation of consumption in Spain is lower as a proportion of GDP than the EU average, 
reflected in the lower revenues obtained from both VAT and excise duties (especially on 
hydrocarbons, transport and alcohol). Environmental taxation is also lower. Revenue from 
taxation on employment in Spain is similar to the EU average as a proportion of GDP, 
although the weight of social security contributions is higher, especially firms’ contributions. 
In turn, the weight of revenue from taxation on capital is higher than the EU average, as the 
taxation of wealth is higher in Spain, while the weight of taxation on firms and on unearned 
income is similar. In this context, however, the available evidence57 shows that the tax 
rates of Spain’s main taxes (VAT, personal income tax, corporate income tax) are generally 
equal to or higher than the EU average, although the effect of exemptions, tax credits and 
special reduced rates tends to generate revenue losses, in addition to possible distortions 
in the efficiency and fairness of the tax system.
The regional government financing system should be reviewed. In an administrative 
structure with such a high level of decentralisation as Spain’s, where regional and local 
government are responsible for more than 40% of public expenditure decisions, their 
cooperation is essential to ensure budgetary stability. In this respect, the general consensus 
is that there should be an overhaul of the financing system of these administrations, based 
on an objective estimate of their expenditure needs, to adapt the revenue at their disposal 
to those needs, ensure transparent distribution between the regional governments and 
55  See, among others, C. Vandierendonck (2014), Public Spending Reviews: design, conduct, implementation, 
European Economy, Economic Papers, no.  525. For the case of Spain, see OECD (2015), Spain: From 
Administrative Reform to Continuous Improvement, OECD Public Governance reviews, Paris.
56  In this context, on 2 June 2017 the Spanish government commissioned the AIReF to undertake a public 
expenditure review, comprising a detailed analysis to assess the quality of public policies. This is an ongoing 
arrangement, including an initial agreement for three years and the results of a first phase assessing expenditure 
on subsidies, to be presented before end-2018. In general, expenditure policy reviews can reveal fiscal scope 
to improve the allocation of public funds. 
57  See, among others, the Informe de la Comisión de Expertos para la Reforma del Sistema Tributario Español 
(2014); and P. Hernández de Cos and D. López Rodríguez (2014), Tax structure and revenue-raising capacity in 
Spain: A comparative analysis with the EU, Banco de España Occasional Papers 1406.
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increase the degree of fiscal co-responsibility.58 In addition, capital market access by 
regional governments should be resumed as a fundamental way to finance their fiscal 
imbalances, making use of the various State funds rolled out during the crisis only in 
exceptional circumstances. In any event, while these arrangements remain operational, 
there must be strict application of their explicit conditions relating to the budgetary 
activities of the administrations concerned to avoid incentivising inappropriate budgetary 
policies.59
The Spanish economy projects relatively modest future potential growth. On the 
estimates available, the potential growth of the Spanish economy – which measures its 
ability to grow in a sustainable and balanced manner in the medium term – is less than 
1.5%, close to the level for the euro area but below that of other developed economies 
such as the United States (see Chart 1.19). Among the main structural factors limiting the 
potential growth of the Spanish economy the following stand out: high structural 
unemployment, population ageing, the lower rate of growth of the labour force participation 
rate owing to demographic change and low productivity as a result of excessive labour 
market duality, regulations that restrict competition and the efficient reallocation of 
resources, and the human and technological capital deficit.60 By contrast, the available 
estimates for potential GDP are possibly not fully factoring in the positive impact on the 
long-term growth of the economy of the past structural reforms in Spain. 
Cutting the persistently high level of unemployment, especially among certain 
groups, is a priority. The employment recovery is weakest among the unemployed with a 
lower level of education. Specifically, in 2017, the unemployment rate among persons with 
a low educational level was more than 30%, affecting in particular the youngest and the 
oldest age groups (see Chart 1.20.4).61 In consequence, public policy should be directed 
at ensuring the employability of these groups, preventing hysteresis effects that hinder 
further reductions in the unemployment rate.
During the last economic crisis there was a notable increase in inequality both in terms 
of per capita income, a pattern which is estimated to have begun to reverse during the 
upturn. The main determinant of this turnaround has been the decline in the unemployment 
rate. Looking forward, further reductions in the income inequality indicators will depend on 
unemployment continuing to decline, which requires improvements to the employability of 
the least skilled, along with an increase in the hours actually worked by employees with lower 
wages. In any event, the causes behind the dynamics of inequality and their effects are 
complex, and learning about them will require an in-depth analysis of the various relevant 
dimensions (wages, household income, consumption and wealth, inter alia), as a prerequisite 
for the design of public policies that promote socially sustainable growth.62
5.2  FACTORS LIMITING 
SPANISH ECONOMIC 
GROWTH IN THE LONG 
TERM
58  See the Informe de la Comisión de Expertos para la Reforma del modelo de financiación autonómica (2017) and 
P. Hernández de Cos and J. J. Pérez (2018), “Regional government financing: options and challenges”, Banco 
de España Occasional Paper, forthcoming.
59  See P. Hernández de Cos and J. J. Pérez (2015), “Reglas fiscales, disciplina presupuestaria y corresponsabilidad 
fiscal”, Papeles de Economía Española, 143, pp. 174-184, and M. Delgado, J.  J. Pérez and C.  I. González 
(2016), “Regional government access to market funding: international experience and recent developments”, 
Economic Bulletin, February, Banco de España.
60  Moreover, R. Gordon (2016), “The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The US standard of living since the Civil 
War”, Princeton University Press, documents other factors common to the majority of developed economies 
that limit productivity, such as tertiarisation, lower competition or the exhaustion of educational gains.
61  See Box 1.2 on the persistence of unemployment in Spain, in Annual Report, 2015, Banco de España.
62  In this respect, the forthcoming Occasional Paper, “Income, consumption and wealth inequality in Spain”, 
analyses in detail the level of and changes in inequality in Spain during the economic crisis and, insofar as the 
available information allows, in the initial phases of the recovery. 
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Demographic patterns will have negative effects on the potential growth of the 
economy. According to INE population projections, the dependency ratio (defined as the 
ratio between the over-65s and those in the 16-64 age group) will grow from 29% at 
present to 65% over the next five decades (up to 2065).63 This population ageing has a 
negative impact on the working age population and pushes down both the labour force 
participation rate and the employment rate.
The challenge posed by demographic change requires that a strategy be defined to 
mitigate its long-term economic impact. In particular, policies that boost the labour 
force participation rate become especially important, given that, if the present participation 
rates by sex and age and the demographic trends towards a larger proportion of older 
population cohorts are maintained, the overall labour force participation rate would fall 
significantly (by approximately 2 pp over the next decade). To counter this effect, policies 
that encourage workers – especially older ones – to join the labour force are required, such 
as, for example, making collecting a pension compatible with working. In addition, 
migration policy restrictions should be reviewed periodically, seeking to adapt them to 
labour market needs, and measures should be taken to encourage a higher birth rate, to 
bring it closer to those in other European countries, encouraging a better work-life balance 
and reducing job instability for women of child-bearing age.
High labour market segmentation hampers productivity gains. In the present recovery 
phase, as was the case before the crisis, temporary employment has continued to grow at 
a faster pace than permanent employment (see Chart 1.20.1). Thus, at end-2017, the ratio 
of temporary to total employment was 26.7%, 0.2 pp above the end-2016 level and 3 pp 
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The potential growth of the Spanish economy has fallen from almost 3% pre-crisis to 1%-1.5% in 2017-22. This modest potential growth is attributable 
to the lower working-age population, the lower labour force participation rate, the lower accumulation of capital and low total factor productivity (TFP). 
This potential growth is similar to that of the euro area but is lower than that estimated for the United States.
63  See «Población y fenómenos demográficos proyectados», INE. On these projections, over the next 50 years the 
Spanish population will fall from the present 46 million to 41 million, even in a scenario of net inflows of 
immigrants of between 50,000 and 100,000 per annum. In any event, demographic projections rely heavily on 
fertility rate and migration balance assumptions. Indeed, using different assumptions for these two variables, 
Eurostat projects an increase in population up to almost 50 million (Population on 1st January by age, sex and 
type of projection, Eurostat).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 60 ANNUAL REPORT, 2017 1. THE RECOVERY IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY: THE LIMITS OF DEMAND-SIDE POLICIES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
above the cyclical low recorded in 2013. It was, however, still some distance from the pre-
crisis levels (33.8% at end-2006).64 This ratio is still the highest among the euro area 
countries, where it stood at 16.2% at end-2017. Moreover there is some evidence that 
new temporary contracts have recently become shorter, increasing labour turnover and 
hindering human capital accumulation (see Chart 1.20.2). In addition, although the part-
time employment rate is 1 pp below the peak observed in 2014 and is below that of other 
European countries, its present level (16.0% at end-2017) is substantially higher than its 
pre-crisis level (12%) and, moreover, there is a high percentage of non-voluntary part-time 
work (see Chart 1.20.3).65 As a result of all the above, the number of hours actually worked 
has fallen, affecting not only average productivity but also wage income inequality.
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The unemployment rate among workers with lower educational levels remains very high. In addition, in the recovery the ratio of temporary to total employ-
ment has risen, temporary contracts have become shorter and there is a high proportion of non-voluntary part-time work.
SOURCES: SPEE, Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, INE and Banco de España.
a Including domestic service contracts only since October 2012.
b Calculated using MCVL (Social Security administrative labour records) data.
c Employed persons who say they are working part-time because they were unable to find full-time work.
d Low: no or only primary education, or having failed to complete, or to successfully complete, lower secondary education. High: tertiary education.
64  Excluding general government, the ratio of temporary to total employment was 27.3% in 2017, similar to the 
figure for 2016 and 2.7 pp higher than at end-2013.
65  See the influence of these factors on alternative measures of unemployment in “Quarterly report on the Spanish 
economy”, Economic Bulletin, 2/2017, Banco de España.
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In general, when facing difficulties, firms continue to prefer to use temporary 
employment to adjust. The latest annual Labour Force Survey available, for 2016, 
confirms that among firms that would cut their labour costs in response to a negative 
demand shock, 54.4% would opt to reduce their temporary workforce, whereas 21.1% 
would opt to cut the number of hours worked. By contrast, only 1.8% of firms would opt 
to cut the fixed portion of wages and 8.8% the variable portion. The most noteworthy 
difference compared with the previous survey available, for 2008, previous to the 2012 
labour market reform, is the increase in the percentage of firms that would opt to cut the 
number of hours worked, from just 5% before the crisis. This change may be attributable 
to the internal flexibility measures in terms of working hours and the changes to 
employment contracts according to the hours worked introduced in the 2012 labour 
market reform and to the regulatory changes made to part-time contracts. That said, 
the latest figures show that regulatory friction persists, relating to the hiring framework 
and to the limited level of representativeness at firm level of the present wage bargaining 
system, hindering a reduction in the high employee turnover rate that characterises the 
Spanish economy.
Improving potential growth requires improving productivity dynamics. Labour 
productivity has barely risen during the present recovery phase. This is similar to the case 
of the last upturn, although then labour productivity was based on growth in the capital-
labour ratio which offset the increase in the proportion of firms with lower total factor 
productivity, whereas since 2014 genuine efficiency gains are being achieved, countered 
by a less intensive use of capital compared with labour. Even so, total factor productivity 
growth remains low.
In this setting, investment in human and technological capital becomes especially 
important. The available evidence shows that during the crisis young people remained in 
education longer, postponing their entry into the labour market, and this pattern has 
continued in the recovery. Thus, the labour force participation rate of young people aged 
16-19 in Spain has fallen from 30% to 15%, parallel to an increase in the percentage of 
young people in formal education or undertaking some form of training, narrowing the 
gap between Spain and other European countries in this respect (see Chart 1.21).66 In any 
event, reform of the Spanish education system is needed in order to close the gap with 
other developed countries in terms of education quality indicators and address the 
challenges posed by globalisation, technological progress and automation, which require 
a re-think of the apprenticeship system and of curriculum content. Furthermore, the 
technological capital gap between Spain and its European partners widened during the 
crisis, owing to lower R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the public sector and, 
especially, in the private sector where the differences are greater. In addition to the 
structural characteristics that limit firms’ ability to innovate (in terms of human capital, 
business capacity, productive structure and financing), and the design of the public R&D 
system which is susceptible to improvement, there are other more temporary cyclical 
aspects, such as the low public budget allocations to innovation and the adverse effects 
on firms’ innovation efforts of the insufficient degree of business competition in certain 
sectors.67
66  In any event, in 2017 the early school-leaving rate, at 18.3%, was still higher than the Europe 2020 strategy 
target of 15% and at some distance from the European rate of 10.7%. The target refers to the population aged 
18-24 with at most lower secondary education and not in education or training.
67  In this respect, in addition, see Chapter 3 of this report on the lower level of investment in intangible assets by 
Spanish firms overall.
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Various regulatory barriers limit the efficient allocation of resources and business 
competition. According to DIRCE statistics,68 9% of active companies were lost between 
2008 and 2014 in Spain. In the period 2014-16, 5  pp of that decline was recovered, 
although the rate of creation of new companies is still low and the rate of destruction of 
companies is still high. Notable among the factors that may be limiting the emergence of 
new business projects are the regulatory barriers to entry in certain markets, such as, for 
example, delays or moratoria in granting licences to pursue certain activities at the local 
level and the limits on competition in certain sectors, such as road and rail passenger 
transport, or those stemming from the delay in the implementation of the Market Unity 
Law.69 Moreover, certain elements of tax and labour regulations penalise companies that 
exceed certain thresholds.70 In addition, there are the problems that arise when non-
productive companies are lost as a result of insolvency proceedings that are not 
sufficiently fast or efficient, along with certain distortions that may favour less productive 
companies.71
The limited correction of mark-ups in the recovery may be attributable to a lack of 
competition in certain productive sectors. During the crisis, the fact that many firms 
needed to improve their financial position, against a backdrop of rising borrowing costs 
and tighter financing conditions, may have justified the increase in unit mark-ups. By contrast, 
in the current phase of the cycle, failure to adjust relative unit operating surpluses vis-à-vis 
the other euro area countries could indicate a lack of competition in some markets, with 
negative implications for continued competitiveness gains that are essential for correction 
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The labour force participation rate of young people in Spain has been falling since the crisis, in tandem with an increase in the percentage of the 
population receiving some form of education or training. This pattern has continued throughout the past four years of recovery.
68  DIRCE, the Central Companies Directory, is a single information system for all Spanish firms and their local units 
located in Spain.
69  In particular, the Constitutional Court judgment against certain articles of the Law required that its effective 
implementation be reviewed. Specifically, the judgment should encourage regions to pool their practices on a 
sector-by-sector basis, to achieve regulatory standards in keeping with best practice, continuing to seek to 
enhance productivity and not erect barriers to entry to potential competitors.
70  See M. Almunia and y D. López-Rodríguez (2018), “Under the Radar: The Effects of Monitoring Firms on Tax 
Compliance”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 10, pp. 1-38, and M. Almunia, J. F. Jimeno 
and D. Lopez-Rodriguez (2018), “Size-Dependent Regulations in Spain”, Working Paper, forthcoming.
71  See Chapter 4 of Banco de España Annual Report, 2016.
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of the external imbalance.72 It is also important for sectors that are not open to trade that 
there is competition and that relative prices grow in a contained manner, given that sectors 
that produce tradable goods include a high proportion of non-tradable goods and services. 
Indeed, competitiveness gains vis-à-vis the euro area have been concentrated on wage 
adjustments rather than mark-ups. The productivity gains associated with the high rate of 
job destruction in the first stages of the crisis, and the wage restraint observed throughout the 
subsequent period, have restored most of the competitiveness lost vis-à-vis the other euro 
area countries, measured in terms of relative unit labour costs (ULCs). Specifically, while for the 
whole of the market economy, between 1999 and 2008 ULCs rose in Spain by 22 pp more than 
in the euro area, the present relative level is just 5 pp higher. However, in terms of unit operating 
surpluses, the loss of competitiveness in the expansionary phase was on a similar scale to that 
of ULCs, but the subsequent correction has been much more modest. This explains why the 
present level of the value added deflator has risen in cumulative terms by 10 pp more in Spain 
than in the euro area overall since the start of Monetary Union (see Chart 1.22).
Despite the recent improvements, Spanish credit institutions face important 
challenges stemming, inter alia, from the legacies of the crisis, the new regulatory 
framework and technological progress.73 Credit institutions should anticipate these 
changes, continuing to serve as effective intermediaries of financial flows in the economy, 
providing the necessary funds on competitive terms to agents in need of financing. 
Although other European credit institutions must also address this challenge, Spain’s 
credit institutions must do so in a setting in which, despite the considerable efforts made 
in recent years in terms of adjustments, write-downs and restructuring, some of the 
consequences of the crisis continue to weigh heavily on them, as analysed in detail in 
Chapter 2. This is the case of the relative volumes of troubled assets, which despite having 
been considerably reduced in recent years are still relatively high, the low levels of return 
on the banking business in Spain and the comparatively low solvency ratios by international 
standards, although they are clearly above the regulatory minimum levels (see Chart 1.23). 
In 2017 the Single Resolution Board resolved Banco Popular Español on account of the 
serious difficulties it was facing. Although the economic recovery will continue to reduce 
troubled (non-performing and foreclosed) assets, it is essential that credit institutions 
persevere in their efforts to continue to pare down these assets. It is equally essential that 
they continue to cut the operating costs of their business in Spain, bearing in mind that 
bank lending is not expected to return to the levels achieved in the expansionary phase 
that preceded the crisis either in the short or the medium term.
The crisis revealed the need to reform the institutional architecture of the euro area. 
In 2017, the European Commission (EC) headed up several initiatives for progress on four 
fronts: political, financial, economic and fiscal union.74 The process proposed by the EC is 
governed by two complementary principles: a higher degree of solidarity and risk-sharing 
between Member States, and greater assumption of responsibility by national authorities, 
including specific measures to reduce risk in their economies. Recent experience in the 
crisis advises the need for simultaneous progress in the aspects highlighted by the EC.75
5.3  NEED TO CONTINUE WITH 
THE REFORMS IN THE 
EURO AREA
72  See Box 1.2, which documents the development of mark-ups in Spain and considers the possible causes.
73  See Chapter 2 of this Annual Report.
74  See the “White Paper on the future of Europe and the way ahead”, March 2017, European Commission, and the 
“Reflection Paper on the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union”, May 2017, European Commission, 
which build on the “Five Presidents’ Report”, June 2015, European Commission.
75  Some of the initiatives to complete the euro area and a possible calendar are set out in Box 5 “The debate on 
euro area governance reform”, “Quarterly Report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2018, Banco 
de España.
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On the financial front, the priority should be to complete banking union. In this area, 
several fundamental issues remain. The first is the creation of a common financial backstop 
for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), where there is broad consensus in favour of the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) assuming this function, possibly through a credit 
line. The adequacy of the liquidity provision facilities in all the phases of the resolution 
process also needs to be reviewed, as there are certain constraints on the availability of 
SRF funds and of ECB liquidity (through either monetary policy operations or emergency 
liquidity assistance). A second fundamental issue pending is the creation of a European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) that will provide all depositors with the same level of 
protection irrespective of where they are located, reduce the likelihood of the emergence 
of mistrust that can lead to mass withdrawals of deposits, and weaken the links between 
banks and sovereigns. In this area progress has been more modest, with a certain degree 
of consensus being reached on the fact that introducing elements into national banking 
systems that entail future risk-sharing will require the parallel implementation of measures 
to reduce the existing risk. There have also been proposals for the creation of sovereign 
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In 2017, relative ULCs continued to improve vis-à-vis the euro area, meaning that the competitiveness lost during the previous expansionary phase has 
been almost recovered. However, in terms of relative gross surplus per unit of output, the present level is very close to the pre-crisis level.
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bond-backed securities (SBBS) which, under certain conditions, could facilitate greater 
diversification of banks’ current sovereign debt portfolios, which have some bias in favour 
of the sovereign debt of the country of issue.76 For the longer term, the possibility of 
developing arrangements for joint debt issues has also been raised, providing safe 
European bonds that would allow governments to obtain funding at a reasonable cost at 
times of crisis. Lastly, the momentum behind the Capital Market Union project should 
permit greater diversification of private sector funding sources and greater robustness of 
private risk-sharing arrangements. The actions adopted in 2017 notably included those 
aimed at promoting funding for innovation and for new and unlisted firms, helping firms 
gain access to capital market funding, and fomenting long-term, sustainable investment 
and investment in infrastructure.
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Spanish credit institutions have lower capital levels and higher non-performing loan levels than their European peers overall. However, they compare 
favourably in terms of efficiency and rate of return, despite their less favourable recent performance. Thus, the efficiency ratio has tended to deteriorate 
in Spain in recent years and rates of return are at historically low levels.
SOURCES: ECB (Consolidated Banking Data), EBA (Risk Dashboard) and Banco de España.
a Consolidated data.
b EU figure for 2017 is at September.
c Owing to comparability and availability issues, in this case the EBA's Risk Dashboard data have been used.
 SPAIN  EU (b)
76  See the ESRB document “High-Level Task Force on Safe Assets”.
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In the area of fiscal policy, the difficulties associated with the present decentralised 
decision-making framework underline the need for supranational instruments to be 
designed to address adverse shocks. In particular, progress is desirable in the creation 
of some kind of common cyclical insurance mechanism that would help relieve the effects 
of the lack of a centralised fiscal capacity and the low stabilisation capacity of the existing 
public and private risk-sharing mechanisms (as evidenced by the limited size of the EU 
budget). Some of the studies available suggest that a mechanism could be designed, 
involving committing a relatively low volume of funds (1% of GDP, which is less than the 
present European budget) and no permanent transfers between States, which would 
provide a fiscal stabilisation capacity similar to that of the federal transfer system in the 
United States.77
Moreover, the current budgetary governance framework should encourage countries 
to generate headroom during expansionary phases. The lack of incentives that are 
sufficiently powerful to create the necessary headroom reduces the stabilisation capacity 
of fiscal policy throughout the euro area at times of crisis. Recent proposals, which seek 
to give more weight to government debt as a medium-term anchor and to the spending 
rule as an operational tool, are appropriate. In any event, it is essential that supervision of 
compliance with the fiscal rules is strengthened. Simplification of the European budgetary 
framework would be conducive to this, as the present framework is overly complex and 
not sufficiently transparent.
Lastly, on the political front the initiatives seek to secure more effective and more 
transparent governance. There is a growing perception of the need to ensure that the 
project to deepen EMU be linked to an increase in its acceptance by European citizens. In 
this respect, the European Parliament’s capacity for oversight is expected to be 
strengthened and existing intergovernmental treaties to be incorporated into the EU legal 
framework. Consensus has also been achieved on the need to create a European Monetary 
Fund (EMF), anchored in European legislation, to assume the functions and increase the 
potential for action of the ESM. Lastly, the European Commission has proposed that the 
post of European Minister for Economy and Finance be created, to improve economic 
policy coordination and accountability to the European Parliament.
77  See Chapter 3 of Banco de España Annual Report, 2016.
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The political situation in Catalonia continues to be one of the main 
domestic risks for the future performance of the Spanish economy 
as a whole, and of this region in particular. However, the escalation 
of tensions, which peaked with the events of October 2017, has 
tended to subside since November.
Against this background, the economic indicators relating to the 
final months of 2017 and the first few months of this year suggest 
that, in contrast to the greater buoyancy recorded in early 2017, 
the Catalan economy has slowed more sharply than the economies 
of the other large regions. This poor relative performance is primarily 
reflected in a set of indicators relating to firms’ employment 
decisions (social security registrations), household consumption 
(retail trade indices), tourism (non-residents’ overnight hotel stays), 
residential investment (house purchases) (see Charts 6 to 9) and 
business investment, according to the evidence available. As for 
financial market indicators, they are showing a return to normal 
(see Charts 1 and 2), following the period immediately after the 
escalation at the beginning of October 2017, when stock market 
volatility increased and the Spanish market performed less 
favourably than the EURO STOXX index. In particular, this was a 
result of the negative behaviour of the share prices of banks, 
especially those that were then headquartered in Catalonia.
However, it is not easy to determine the extent to which the less 
favourable performance of the economic indicators of this region 
is linked to the political situation, since other factors may be 
affecting the Catalan economy simultaneously. It is also difficult to 
BOX 1.1ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE POLITICAL TENSIONS IN CATALONIA
SOURCES: INE, IESE Business School, FUNCAS, CIS Barometer, PRS Group and Banco de España.
a Synthetic indicator based on indicators of the volatility of the IBEX-35, exchange rates, oil prices and ten-year bonds.
b Synthetic indicator based on CIS political assessment indicators (current and expectations), political risk indicator (PRS Group), national parliament fragmentation 
index, Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU), and disagreement in the public deficit forecasts.
c The scenarios correspond to the hypotheses used in Box 1.1, "The Economic Impact of Uncertainty Arising from Political Tensions in Catalonia", Financial Stability 
Report, November 2017, Banco de España. In scenario 1 it is assumed that the level of uncertainty increases temporarily in 2017 Q4, and returns to the 2017 Q3 
level in 2018 Q1. This increase is calibrated on the basis of the statistical distribution of the measures of uncertainty considered, which increase by a magnitude 
that is in the 90th percentile of each series (i.e. only 10% of the historical changes in each individual indicator are higher than those assumed). Scenario 2 assumes 
an increase in uncertainty in 2017 Q4 equivalent to that recorded in the historical episode with the sharpest rise and that following this initial shock the level of the 
uncertainty indicators decreases linearly over the simulation horizon.
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estimate the extent to which these events may have affected the 
economic buoyancy of other regions, through the direct trade links 
existing between the different geographical points of Spain and 
the general climate of uncertainty they may have given rise to. In 
fact, the main channel through which the political situation in 
Catalonia may be affecting its economy, and the Spanish economy 
as a whole, would be the latter one, insofar as it has an impact on 
agents’ confidence and, consequently, their spending decisions 
and financing conditions.
In this respect, the available indicators of economic uncertainty, 
relating to the country as a whole, show that the significant 
BOX 1.1 ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE POLITICAL TENSIONS IN CATALONIA (cont’d)
SOURCES: INE, AIReF and Banco de España.
a AIReF estimations.
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BOX ?
 
TÍTULO RECUADRO BOX 1.1 ECON MIC IMPACT OF THE POLITICAL TENSIONS IN CATALONIA (cont’d)
increase in October last year was temporary; in subsequent 
months the values of the indicators returned towards more normal 
levels, in line with those observed in the months leading up to the 
peak in political tensions late last year (see Charts 3 and 4). The 
developments in the indicators are in keeping with the most benign 
hypothetical scenario of those for which simulations were 
presented in the Banco de Espana’s Financial Stability Report 
published on 11 November 2017.1 These hypothetical scenarios 
were based on historical episodes in which significant increases in 
uncertainty were observed and incorporated various hypotheses 
regarding how long the current episode may last.
In the short and medium term, the ultimate impact on the Spanish 
economy as a whole of this element of risk will depend on the eventual 
magnitude and duration of the current episode of political uncertainty. 
An easing of tensions in Catalonia could lead to a scenario of higher 
growth. On the other hand, the recent fresh outbreak of tensions could 
have an adverse effect on the confidence of agents and on activity. The 
persistent uncertainty regarding the future of the current legislature, 
following the regional elections of last December, may affect the 
process of normalisation that was perceptible just a few months ago.
1  See Box 1.1, “The economic impact of uncertainty arising from political 
tensions in Catalonia”, Financial Stability Report, Banco de España, 
November 2017. In particular, it was assumed in an initial scenario that 
there would be a temporary, limited increase in uncertainty leading to a 
cumulative loss of GDP by the end of 2019 of some 0.3 percentage 
points, while another more severe and prolonged scenario had a 
substantially larger loss of output. For a description of the econometric
   models that measure the response of economic activity and the 
components of demand to fluctuations in uncertainty, see the analytical 
article “Macroeconomic uncertainty: measurement and impact on the 
Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2017, Banco de España.
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Since the start of the crisis there has been a major improvement in 
the competitiveness of the Spanish economy. Relative to the euro 
area, the competitiveness gains have been more apparent in terms 
of unit labour costs than in terms of prices. Between 2008 and 
2017, the losses in competitiveness that had built-up since the 
start of EMU, as measured by relative unit labour costs, were 
almost completely corrected. However, the correction is much 
more modest when the change in the real effective exchange rate 
– based on the CPI or relative industrial prices – is considered. 
That is to say, although price increases have in recent years been 
more contained in Spain than in the euro area, this has not been 
sufficient to offset the sharp relative price deterioration that 
occurred during the pre-2008 upswing.
An analysis of the behaviour of mark-ups, defined as the difference 
between the selling price and production costs, may shed light on 
the factors underlying the differing behaviour of prices and 
compensation per employee. However, one of the difficulties 
involved in analysing mark-ups is that they cannot be directly 
observed, although they can be estimated.
Charts 3 and 4 show estimates of mark-ups – defined as the ratio 
between the gross operating surplus and gross value added of 
non-financial corporations – for various euro area countries based 
on national accounts data. During the crisis mark-ups in Spain and 
Portugal increased, in contrast to the more-or-less-pronounced 
declines recorded in Italy, France and Germany.
Although there is no widely accepted theoretical approach to 
explain the cyclical behaviour of mark-ups, there is an abundant 
economic literature documenting a pattern similar to that seen in 
Spain during the crisis and relating it to the need for firms to 
continue to have internal funds available when financing conditions 
are unfavourable. This argument appears to be particularly 
appropriate to account for events during the financial crisis, when 
mark-ups rose very significantly in the peripheral euro area 
countries and in other economies such as the United States.1 
Gilchrist et al. (2017)2 show that, in a context of intense financial 
pressure (high levels of debt, tightening financing conditions and 
restricted access to new lending), US firms decided to raise their 
mark-ups at the beginning of the crisis in 2008, despite the 
weakness of demand and the possibility of losing market share, as 
a means of generating internal funds and meeting their financial 
obligations, improving their financial position, financing investment 
projects and accommodating potential financial shocks.
However, the validity of the above argument is less clear when we 
consider the developments in mark-ups during the current 
recovery. As seen in Charts 3 and 4, despite the significant 
improvement in financial conditions in recent years, mark-ups 
have not been reduced since 2014 in the countries included and, 
in the case of Spain and Portugal, have remained as firm as in the 
early years of the crisis.3
Based on information for individual non-financial Spanish firms, 
Montero and Urtasun (2014)4 analyse the relationship between the 
increase in price-cost mark-ups and financial pressure in various 
industries over the period 2007-2011, and also consider other 
variables that may, in principle, help to explain the behaviour of 
mark-ups, which approximate the degree of competition, business 
size and the degree of innovation within companies. The results 
confirm the relevance of the degree of financial pressure as a 
significant determinant of the mark-ups of non-financial 
corporations, and also show the relevance of the degree of 
competition in the industry to explain changes in mark-ups in 
Spain. In particular, mark-ups increase to a greater extent in those 
industries subject to greater financial constraints, but also in those 
in which the level of competition is lower.
This latter finding may mean that the maintenance of high mark-
ups during the current upturn reflects a lack of competition in 
some industries, and that this factor predominates over the effect, 
with a negative sign, that the improvement in financial conditions 
may be having on mark-ups. As seen in Chart 5, external financing 
channels5 – essentially bank finance in the case of Spanish SMEs –6 
have been reviving over the last three years. Against a background 
of recovering activity, this should be conducive to a gradual 
reduction in the mark-ups charged on top of the firm’s various 
costs. However, Chart 6 shows that the decline in the degree of 
competition that occurred during the crisis as a result of the 
disappearance of a significant number of firms has still not been 
corrected. In particular, although the concentration indices 
considered show significant losses of competition between the 
period of global financial crisis (2008-2009) and the subsequent 
recession (2010-2013), levels of competition in the Spanish 
economy remained practically unchanged during the start of the 
current recovery (2014-2015). For instance, the degree of 
concentration, as approximated by the market share of the four 
BOX 1.2THE BEHAVIOUR OF MARK-UPS DURING THE CRISIS AND THE RECOVERY
1  Although developments in mark-ups were qualitatively similar, the 
adjustment during the crisis in terms of employment and wages was 
more pronounced in the case of Spain than in other advanced economies 
such as the United States.
2  S. Gilchrist, R. Schoenle, J. Sim and E. Zakrajsek (2017), “Inflation 
Dynamics during the Financial Crisis”, American Economic Review, 
vol. 107(3), pp. 785-823.
3  Also, firm-level data from the Banco de España’s Central Balance Sheet 
Data Office show that the accounting mark-ups of Spanish firms – 
measured as the ratio of gross operating surplus to value added – 
increased during the initial years of the recovery (2014-2015). 
4  J. Montero and A. Urtasun (2014), Price-cost mark-ups in the Spanish 
economy: a microeconomic perspective, Working Paper 1407, Banco de 
España.
5  Another factor to take into account is the decline from 2013 in bank 
lending rates, which stood, especially in some segments, well above 
those observed in the core euro area countries and which have tended 
since then to converge on those of these countries, as a consequence of 
the various measures taken both nationally (restructuring of the financial 
system) and at the European level (the ECB’s monetary policy measures).
6  Specifically it can be seen how the proportion of Spanish firms facing 
borrowing constraints, which in the depths of the crisis was much larger 
than in the euro area as a whole, has been gradually falling, to around 
average euro area levels (see Chapter 2, Annual Report 2016, Banco de 
España, for more details).
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BOX 1.2 THE BEHAVIOUR OF MARK-UPS DURING THE CRISIS AND THE RECOVERY (cont’d)
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largest firms in each industry (CR4), increased by 10% during the 
crisis and only declined by 0.1% during the subsequent recovery.7
In the current circumstances, it is necessary to assess in which 
industries there may be insufficient competition and to review 
certain barriers, including regulatory ones, to the participation of a 
greater number of competitors, in order not only to improve 
consumer welfare, but also to increase the positive effects of the 
reforms introduced in labour and financial markets.
BOX 1.2 THE BEHAVIOUR OF MARK-UPS DURING THE CRISIS AND THE RECOVERY (cont’d)
7  The concentration indices considered have a number of drawbacks as 
indicators of the degree of effective competition as they depend crucially 
on how the relevant market is defined. In this case the relevant market is
   considered to be the industry in which firms operate at national level, 
without taking into account, for example, the geographical dimension, 
which in some industries may be a factor in determining the relevant 
market.
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Over the last few years, the ECB’s monetary policy has provided a 
significant stimulus, through historically low key policy rates and 
the implementation of non-standard measures, including the 
expansion of its balance sheet (asset purchase programme (APP) 
and targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs)), and of 
forward guidance. These actions have contributed to loosen 
financial conditions, acting as one of the fundamental drivers of 
the economic recovery in the euro area and have helped to counter 
deflationary pressures. This box presents empirical evidence on 
the macroeconomic impact of the measures taken by the ECB in 
recent years, both in the euro area and on the Spanish economy, 
updating the findings presented in Banco de España (2016).1
To measure the impact of monetary measures in the euro area, a 
structural autoregressive vector model2 is used that captures the 
effect of monetary policy through the size of the Eurosystem’s 
balance sheet. As a first step, a baseline scenario with no balance 
sheet expansion measures and an alternative scenario incorporating 
APP asset purchases and TLTRO allotments are constructed. A 
comparison of these two scenarios shows that over the period 
2015-2018 the ECB’s measures had a cumulative impact of some 
2.3 pp on the real GDP growth rate and of 1.7 pp on the euro area 
inflation rate, as measured by the HICP (see Chart 1).3
The impact of the monetary measures on the Spanish economy is 
analysed using the Quarterly Model of the Banco de España 
(MTBE), which includes with a high degree of detail the 
interrelationships among the aggregate variables.4 The model 
incorporates the effects of monetary policy on the Spanish 
economy through the trade channel, deriving from an increase in 
exports due to higher euro area growth, as well as those operating 
through changes in financial conditions, such as the exchange 
rate, stock prices and the cost of bank financing. The methodology 
used to estimate the effects of monetary measures on the 
exchange rate and stock prices is the “event study approach”, 
which considers as an impact the response of the prices of various 
financial assets to the announcements of monetary policy 
measures.5 As a result of this exercise, it is estimated that the 
ECB’s monetary policy prompted a depreciation of the euro of 
around 11% and a rise in stock prices of around 18% between 
mid-2014 and the last event considered (see Chart 2).6 The 
transmission of the ECB’s measures to the cost of bank financing 
is slower and its identification is based on models seeking to 
approximate the behaviour of bank rates, which incorporate 
interbank rates as determinants, as well as proxy variables for the 
business cycle and the risk premium. The methodology of Banco 
de España (2016) is followed, with the preparation of a 
counterfactual scenario “in the absence of measures”, which 
assumes, inter alia, that interbank rates would have remained 
unchanged. On the basis of this approximation, the impact of the 
ECB’s measures on bank lending rates is estimated to range 
between 85 and 110 bp (see Chart 2).7
When all these assumptions are incorporated into the MTBE, an 
estimate is obtained of the effect of the monetary stimulus 
measures on real GDP and the CPI in Spain. As seen in Charts 3 
and 4, the measures have had significant positive effects on both 
variables. It is estimated that, by the end of this year, the measures 
will have raised real GDP by 2.3% and the CPI by 1.4%. These 
effects are of a very similar magnitude to those estimated for the 
euro area as a whole.8 As regards their composition, Table 1 
shows the contributions of domestic demand and net exports to 
the impact on GDP, the improvement in domestic demand 
explaining somewhat more than two-thirds of this boost, in 
cumulative terms.
In addition to the macroeconomic estimations presented, the 
effects of recent monetary policy on other variables of interest are 
also relevant. On one hand, according to successive Bank Lending 
Surveys, the Eurosystem’s monetary measures since 2014 have 
had positive effects on liquidity, financing conditions and the 
capital of euro area banks.9 However, the effects on bank 
profitability seem to be more ambiguous: the (qualitative) surveys 
mentioned above suggest that the various measures have 
BOX 1.3THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY
1  See Chapter 3, Annual Report 2015, Banco de España.
2  See P. Burriel and A. Galesi (2018), “Uncovering the heterogeneous 
effects of ECB unconventional monetary policies across euro area 
countries”, European Economic Review, 101, January, pp. 210-229.
3  These values are within the ranges of effects estimated by the ECB. See, 
for example, V. Constâncio (2017), “Effectiveness of Monetary Union 
and the Capital Markets Union”, speech, 6 April, Malta.
4  See A. Arencibia, S. Hurtado, M. de Luis López and E. Ortega, 2017, 
New Version of the Quarterly Model of Banco de España (MTBE), 
Occasional Paper 1709, Banco de España.
5  Specifically, the change in prices within a two-day window (between the 
close of business on the day preceding and on the day following the 
event considered) is calculated for around 45 events, including meetings 
of the ECB’s Governing Council at which measures are announced, 
publication of the accounts of meetings and speeches by Council 
members perceived as indicating the possibility of imminent adoption of 
measures. The selection of dates is similar to that of Banco de España 
(2016), adding the meetings of the Governing Council and the publication 
of accounts up to the decisions of October 2017, the final event 
considered. For further details of the hypotheses and other considerations
   in relation to this methodology, see Chapter 3, Annual Report 2015, 
Banco de España. Alternative measures of the impact of actions on 
financial conditions are to be found in V. Constâncio (2017). “Effectiveness 
of Monetary Union and the Capital Markets Union”, speech, 6 April. 
Malta.
6  Also, it is estimated that the measures reduced Spain’s sovereign risk 
premium by some 70 bp, with respect to the German Bund, information 
that is used later to measure the impact of the actions on bank rates.
7  In the case of corporate loans of less than €1 million, that part of the fall 
in rates attributed to monetary policy is small. However, it is possible 
that the effects are being underestimated as the equations do not 
capture the positive effect of TLTROs on the cost of bank liabilities and 
the terms and conditions of these loans.
8  The similarity of the macroeconomic effects of monetary measures does 
not mean, however, that the transmission channels have been the same 
as those in the euro area as a whole. For an analysis of the transmission 
channels of non-standard monetary policy in the context of a monetary 
union with heterogeneity among its members, see Box 3.3, Annual 
Report 2015, Banco de España.
9  The evidence can be found, for example, in Ó. Arce and A. del Río (2018), 
“Las implicaciones macroeconómicas y sobre el sector bancario de la 
política monetaria del BCE”, Papeles de Economía Española, No. 155
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BOX 1.3THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY (cont’d)
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The monetary policy measures introduced since 2014 have led to a significant easing of financial conditions in Spain and the rest of the euro area
(bank lending rates, sovereign debt spread, exchange rate, etc.). This in turn has had a notably positive effect on GDP and inflation in Spain and in the
euro area as a whole in the period 2014-17, which is projected to continue to some degree in 2018.
SOURCES: Eurostat, ECB and Banco de España.
a Estimation based on Burriel and Galesi (2018): “Uncovering the Heterogeneous Effects of ECB Unconventional Monetary Policies across Euro Area Countries”, 
European Economic Review, 101, pp. 210-229. The 2018 data are March MPE projections.
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THE EFFECT OF QUANTITATIVE EASING MEASURES IN SPAIN (a)
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Percentage deviations from baseline scenario levels, calculated using the Quarterly Model of the Banco de España (MTBE).
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counteracting effects,10 while the quantitative analyses show 
neutral net effects.11 The empirical evidence also suggests that the 
measures have had clearly positive effects, especially the corporate 
sector purchase programme (CSPP) on market financing to non-
financial corporations and, indirectly, on the availability of credit to 
small businesses.12 Finally, monetary measures appear to have 
had a positive impact on the public finances of the main euro area 
countries, by reducing the burden of public debt interest payments 
and, indirectly, through the macroeconomic impact on cyclical 
items of revenue and expenditure.13
BOX 1.3THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY (cont’d)
10  According to the BLS, the TLTRO and APP programmes have had 
opposite effects on banking profitability, although the number of banks 
reporting positive effects of the former far exceeds the number of those 
reporting negative effects of the latter. There appears to be greater 
consensus among banks regarding the adverse effects on their 
profitability of the negative interest rate policy.
11  For a quantitative analysis of the various channels through which 
monetary measures affect banking profitability, see, for example, B. 
Cœuré (2016), Assessing the implications of negative interest rates, 
speech at the Yale Financial Crisis Forum, 28 July 2016, ECB, and Ó. 
Arce, M. García-Posada, S. Mayordomo and S. Ongena (2018), 
Adapting lending policies when negative interest rates hit banks’ 
profits, Banco de España, mimeo.
12  See Making room for the needy: The credit-reallocation effects of the 
ECB’s Corporate QE, Working Paper 1743, Banco de España (2017).
13  See the analytical article “The impact of unconventional monetary 
policy on euro area public finances”, Economic Bulletin, 3/2017, Banco 
de España.
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Spain’s government debt-to-GDP ratio and structural budget 
deficit are both well above the limits established within the 
framework of the budgetary rules defined in the European Union’s 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which means that further fiscal 
consolidation will be required in the coming years. Apart from 
these constraints, there are economic reasons, relating to the 
need to reduce the vulnerabilities of the Spanish economy (as 
mentioned in the main text of this chapter), which make it advisable 
to continue with this process. This box presents a discussion of 
various short and medium-term scenarios for public finances.
The Spanish government is currently subject to an excessive 
deficit procedure (EDP), which was opened in April 2009,1 under 
the so-called corrective arm of the SGP. Apart from France, whose 
EDP is expected to be closed this year, Spain is currently the only 
country in the Union recording an “excessive deficit”, i.e. a budget 
deficit of more than 3% of GDP. The deadline set by the EU Council 
for remedying this situation is 2018.2 In this respect, the draft state 
budget for 2018, presented on 27 March, projects a budget deficit 
of 2.2% of GDP this year.
When the Council determines that a member country has 
overcome an EDP situation it automatically becomes subject to 
the “preventive arm” of the SGP. In this new situation, the country 
remains subject to a set of rules that restrict its fiscal policy 
actions, which in the case of Spain would involve the following 
requirements. First, the structural budget deficit, which according 
to the European Commission stood at 3.1% in 2017, should 
decline by 0.5 pp of GDP each year under normal conditions,3 until 
the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) of structural balance 
is achieved. Second, the public debt-to-GDP ratio must be 
reduced each year by one-twentieth of the difference between the 
level that year and the 60% target. Given that the debt ratio stood 
at 98.3% of GDP in 2017 this rule would require an average annual 
reduction of 1.5 pp of GDP over the next decade. Finally annual 
growth of general government spending should be less than or 
equal to the medium-term potential growth of the economy.4
In order to assess the impact of these requirements, hypothetical 
scenarios are provided below illustrating the impact of compliance 
on the medium-term public debt-to-GDP ratio, depending on a 
number of macroeconomic and financial assumptions. The chart 
BOX 1.4SHORT AND MEDIUM-TERM FISCAL POLICY SCENARIOS
1  Determined in the EU Council Decision of 27 April 2009.
2  According to EU Council Decision of 8 August 2016, Spain must reduce 
its general government deficit to 2.2% of GDP in 2018 and achieve a 
cumulative improvement of 0.6 pp of GDP in the structural balance 
between 2016 and 2018. 
SOURCE: Banco de España, using the model described in P. Hernández de Cos, D. López Rodríguez and J. J. Pérez (2018), The challenges of public deleveraging, 
Occasional Paper 1803, Banco de España.
a Maximum annual fiscal effort scenario (change in structural balance) of 0.5 pp per annum, until the Medium-Term Objective is attained (structural balance = 0). In 
the scenario of potential growth = 1.5% and compliance with the debt rule, the constant annual fiscal adjustment is calculated so that the rule is complied with on 
average, i.e. so that the annual average change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio is a reduction of 1/20 of the difference between the debt value for each year and 
the 60% reference.
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3  More generally, under European regulations, the adjustment required, in 
terms of the change in the structural balance, is modulated in accordance 
with a matrix of cases that takes into account the levels of the output 
gap and public debt and the European Commission’s assessment as to 
whether or not there is a debt sustainability risk. Thus, for example, if the 
output gap is greater than 1.5 pp, public debt is greater than 60% and 
the Commission’s assessment is that there is no public debt sustainability 
risk, the structural adjustment required would be either more than 0.75 
pp, if GDP growth is below potential, or more than 1 pp, if growth is 
above potential. For further details, see European Commission (2016), 
“Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact 
and Guidelines on the format and content of Stability and Convergence 
Programmes”
4  The Commission and the Council monitor compliance with these 
requirements, so that, in the event that “significant deviations” are 
identified, a process is launched to correct them. If this is not observed, 
sanctions can be imposed.
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presents hypothetical scenarios for public debt over the next 
decade based on a model simulating the dynamics of public debt.5 
It can be seen that a process of public deleveraging as required by 
the SGP in the case of the Spanish economy will require a 
significant and long-lasting fiscal consolidation.
Specifically, given the level of the public debt-to-GDP ratio in 2017 
and the European Commission’s estimates of the Spanish general 
government structural deficit for the same year, and assuming 
average nominal economic growth over the coming decade of 3% 
and implicit public debt interest rates of 2.5%, meeting this 
objective would require an average primary surplus of 0.8% of 
GDP, as compared with the deficit of 0.6% of GDP estimated for 
2017, which would place the public debt-to-GDP ratio slightly 
above 85% in 2027. Average real GDP growth 1 pp higher than in 
this scenario would, keeping the other assumptions unchanged, 
lead to a public debt-to-GDP ratio of around 80% in 2027 or, 
alternatively, a public debt-to-GDP ratio similar to that in the 
preceding scenario, but with a significantly lower fiscal effort. In 
the latter case, the average primary surplus necessary to achieve 
this level of debt would be 0.2% of GDP, 0.6 pp per year below the 
baseline scenario.
These simulations highlight the importance of pressing ahead with 
fiscal consolidation while at the same time implementing the 
structural reforms necessary to increase the economy’s growth 
capacity. The simulations presented also show the difficulty of 
meeting the conditions laid down in the First transitional provision 
of the Organic Law on Budgetary Stability and Financial 
Sustainability (LOEPSF by its Spanish abbreviation) on the 
transitional period for convergence with the reference values set 
by that law, which are in line with those in the SGP, i.e. 60% for 
general government as a whole. According to this provision, the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio for each tier of government should be 
reduced at the annual average rate necessary to achieve this 
aggregate limit in 2020.6 Given the current levels of the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio of slightly above 98% of GDP, meeting the 
objective in 2020 would require a reduction of around 40 pp in the 
ratio over three years, an even larger correction than in the previous 
public-sector deleveraging process that took place between 1997 
and 2007, when this ratio was reduced by some 30 pp over 
somewhat more than a decade, against a very favourable 
macroeconomic backdrop. In this respect, in line with the 
recommendations of the Spanish Independent Authority for Fiscal 
Responsibility (AIReF by its Spanish abbreviation), it would be 
advisable to use the appropriate legal mechanisms to extend the 
transitional period for meeting the limit set in the LOEPSF, adapting 
the requirements specified in the first transitional provision of this 
law and defining a credible and demanding reference path for 
sustained reduction of the debt ratio, that is consistent in any 
event with the requirements of the SGP.7
BOX 1.4SHORT AND MEDIUM-TERM FISCAL POLICY SCENARIOS (cont’d)
5  See P. Hernández de Cos, D. López-Rodríguez and J. J. Pérez (2018), 
The challenges of public deleveraging, Occasional Paper 1803, Banco 
de España.
6  Some further requirements are also established for the transition phase, 
under normal conditions: i) the change in the non-financial expenditure 
of each tier of government may not exceed the Spanish economy’s real 
GDP growth rate; ii) when the Spanish economy achieves a real growth 
rate of at least 2% per annum or generates net employment with growth 
of at least 2% per annum, the public debt ratio must be reduced annually 
by at least 2 pp of GDP; iii) the structural deficit of general government 
as a whole must be reduced on average by at least 0.8% of GDP per 
annum, although in the event of an EDP, the deficit reduction must be in 
line with the requirements of the latter. Also, the LOEPSF gives an 
absolute priority to the payment of public debt interest and capital 
charges over all other budgetary commitments, which may be especially 
important to dispel any doubts that may arise regarding the public 
finances at times of financial instability or deterioration in confidence.
7  See the AIReF’s report of 20 July 2016 “Report on compliance with the 
Budget Stability and debt targets and with the expenditure rule 2016 by 
the different public administrations”.
